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«[E]conomic theory suggests [carbon] markets should merge, and over time they probably will
merge because of benefits of consolidation, including stability and lower cost.
...
[A recent study on linking found] benefits accrued for all parties as the market grew, though
some parties benefitted more than others ... Expanding the partnership can be welfare im-
proving in total but it can have distributional effects ... [That is,] different countries may
benefit more or less depending on the mix of buyers and sellers who join any given market.»
— Forbes, December 7, 2015
1 Introduction
Markets for emission permits have become an important policy instrument in responding to
the climate change externality. A patchwork of emissions trading systems (ETSs), covering
almost a quarter of global emissions, are now operational in jurisdictions including the EU,
Switzerland, South Korea, New Zealand, China as well as several US states and Canadian
provinces. Many more are in the pipeline (ICAP, 2019; World Bank, 2019). For the most
part, permits cannot be traded across systems and the observed autarky prices for permits,
their variability and comovement differ significantly. If these ETSs can be integrated through
linking, substantial cost savings can in principle become available due to increased efficiency
and stability. The opening quotes recognize these savings and highlight that although link-
ing can be beneficial to all partnering jurisdictions, thorny distributional issues may arise
depending on who the linking partners are. Understanding the determinants of multilateral
linkages and how benefits from linking are shared is therefore a natural question, yet research
is so far limited (Mehling et al., 2018). In this paper we propose a general model to describe
and rigorously analyze multilateral linking, which presents an opportunity for achieving the
ambitious goals of the Paris Agreement cost-effectively (Bodansky et al., 2016).
Our analysis quantifies the efficiency gains from linking which accrue to an individual juris-
diction participating in an arbitrary linkage group. We establish two decompositions of these
gains. The first one identifies two independent sources of efficiency gains, namely effort- and
risk-sharing gains. The former results from the heterogeneity in both abatement technologies
and ambition levels of the group members. The latter is attributable to risk pooling associ-
ated with the uncertainty affecting each group member’s demand for permits, our focus in
this paper. The second decomposition allows us to express individual and aggregate gains in
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any linkage group as simple functions of aggregate gains in all its internal bilateral linkages,
thereby representing a linkage group as the union of its building blocks.
These decompositions are complementary. The decomposition into effort and risk sharing
offers a compact and intuitive interpretation of individual efficiency gains as a function of
the expectation and variance of the autarky-linking price difference. Yet, it is unclear prima
facie how efficiency gains, especially those due to risk sharing, relate to jurisdictions’ charac-
teristics. In this respect, the decomposition into internal bilateral links enables us to easily
compute the efficiency gains generated by arbitrary linkage groups, which constitutes a piv-
otal tool for a quantitative illustration of our model. Additionally, it allows us to tease out
and formally analyze the determinants of linkage gains and preferences.
Specifically, to study the efficiency gains from linking ETSs multilaterally and under uncer-
tainty we start from a standard framework featuring permit demand shocks à la Weitzman
(1974) and Yohe (1978). Our benchmark model is set up in a static environment where do-
mestic emissions caps are assumed exogenously given and fixed to isolate the efficiency gains
from linkage. The benchmark model abstracts from endogenous selection of domestic caps
and intertemporal permit trading. We formally analyze the implications of allowing them in
two extensions to our benchmark model below and show that our results continue to hold.
Our bilateral decomposition result allows us to rank groups from the perspective of indi-
vidual jurisdictions and characterize the aggregate gains from the union of disjoint groups
analytically. In turn, we emphasize why the conditions for the global market to be the most
preferred group universally are unlikely to be satisfied in practice and we show that jurisdic-
tional preferences for smaller linkage groups cannot be aligned without politically unpalatable
compensatory monetary transfers. Additionally, we clarify the relationship between autarky
and linking permit prices. In line with one’s intuition, we show that relative to autarky
linkage reduces price volatility on average though not necessarily for each individual entity.
We provide a precise characterization of this effect.
We illustrate the quantitative implications of our model by focusing on all possible linkages
across ETSs covering the CO2 emissions from the power sectors of five real-world jurisdictions
which all use or have considered both emissions trading and linking. Specifically, we calibrate
our model to Australia, Canada, the EU, South Korea and the USA assuming that each
jurisdiction implements its Paris Agreement pledge. We find that the linkage group which
includes all five jurisdictions can generate total efficiency gains of up to $3.26 billion (constant
2005 US$) per annum which are split approximately equally between effort sharing, $1.58
billion, and risk sharing, $1.68 billion. Despite generating the largest aggregate gains, we
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note that this group is not the most preferred option unanimously. In fact, it is not the most
preferred option for any individual jurisdiction. For instance, the USA would gain the most
in a linking group with Australia and Europe. This three-jurisdiction group would also lead
to lower price variability than in the group where all jurisdictions are linked.
How are these results altered if jurisdictions anticipate the option of future linking when
choosing their domestic emissions caps, or if unrestricted intertemporal permit trade is al-
lowed? First, we endogenize domestic cap selection based on self interest and in anticipation
of linking à la Helm (2003). We derive closed-form solutions for the induced strategic and
damage welfare impacts from linkage. The signs and magnitudes of these impacts are ambigu-
ous and depend on the modeling structure and parameter distributions, as the subsequent
literature attests, e.g. Carbone et al. (2009) and Gersbach & Winkler (2011). Crucially, they
exist independently of the efficiency gains we focus on here, justifying the omission of these
effects from the benchmark model. Second, we show in a multi-period setting how the intro-
duction of unrestricted intertemporal permit trading alters, but crucially does not eliminate,
the efficiency gains due to linking. In our quantitative illustration we find that allowing for
unrestricted intertemporal trading reduces the effort- and risk-sharing gains by about 30%
and 60%, respectively.
Throughout we abstract from economic, political and other (in)direct costs of linking which
could preclude linkages that are otherwise beneficial. For example, significant and persistent
differences in jurisdictional ambition levels imply some jurisdictions, and some regulated firms
within jurisdictions, are net permit buyers in mutually beneficial trades but which nonetheless
trigger ongoing financial transfers. These financial transfers in the buying jurisdictions and
firms, as well as the persistently stricter-than-cap emission and higher permit price levels in
the selling jurisdictions, can face political resistance (Jaffe et al., 2009).
These and related considerations can be a motive for increasing jurisdictions’ emission caps
strategically, e.g. as a result of domestic political lobbying (Habla & Winkler, 2013; Marchiori
et al., 2017). Moreover, properly accounting for the general equilibrium interactions between
the price in a linked permit market and the rest of the economy (Babiker et al., 2004; Carbone
et al., 2009; Böhringer et al., 2014b), as well as the interactions with pre-existing distortionary
tax systems (Bovenberg & Goulder, 1996; Babiker et al., 2003; Barrage, 2019) can generate
implicit costs due to relative price changes triggered by linking. In addition, there are also
direct transaction costs associated with inter-jurisdictional trading which might mitigate
efficiency gains from linking (Baudry et al., 2019), e.g. due to a hierarchical transaction
network structure (Karpf et al., 2018) and a home bias (Hintermann & Ludwig, 2019).
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In fact, the balance between the efficiency gains and linkage costs may be one reason why some
jurisdictions are already linked (e.g. California and Québec) while other links are expected
to take a long time to emerge (e.g. the EU and the Chinese national ETS). In this paper we
exclusively study the efficiency gains from linkage not because we think the associated costs
are negligible but because the efficiency gains provide a potent incentive for jurisdictions to
try to overcome them.
First and foremost, our paper is related to the literature on the economics of linking which
has primarily emphasized three sources of gains from linking agreements, namely price con-
vergence, a cost-effective reallocation of abatement efforts and a reduction of price volatil-
ity (Stevens & Rose, 2002; Flachsland et al., 2009; Fankhauser & Hepburn, 2010; Pizer &
Yates, 2015; Ranson & Stavins, 2016; Doda & Taschini, 2017; Rose et al., 2018; Quemin &
de Perthuis, 2019). Our two decomposition results allow us to formalize and refine these
arguments in a multilateral setup under uncertainty. Specifically, we offer a precise charac-
terization of both effort-sharing and risk-sharing gains from linkage, qualifying the results in
Newell & Stavins (2003) and Caillaud & Demange (2017), who respectively studied efficiency
gains in using market-based instruments relative to command-and-control policies, and link-
ing disjoint ETSs. Additionally, we utilize our bilateral decomposition result to get a better
sense of linkage preferences and we further characterize permit price properties.
While our work is framed in the context of linking permit markets, it also relates to the
use of efficiency-improving trading ratios within permit markets (Holland & Yates, 2015). It
is similar in spirit to the multinational production-location decision studied in de Meza &
van der Ploeg (1987) and the choice of decentralization in permit markets analyzed by Yates
(2002). Additionally, our results can have implications for interconnections between other
types of supply-control programs with transferable licenses (e.g. production or fishery quotas)
and international trade (e.g. cross-border electricity trading or energy unions). For instance,
our paper formalizes some risk-sharing features attributable to permit transferability that
were first highlighted in a more general context by Krishna & Tan (1999). In this respect, it
also relates to several recent studies focusing on efficient risk sharing through international
finance (Callen et al., 2015) or power interconnections (Antweiler, 2016).
Strategic aspects of inter-jurisdictional permit trading have been widely studied since the sem-
inal contributions by Carraro & Siniscalco (1993), Barrett (1994) and Helm (2003). These
papers reach somewhat pessimistic conclusions about the prospects of self-enforcing interna-
tional permit trading schemes, for example, that linking markets creates incentives to relax
domestic caps. More recently, Habla & Winkler (2018) find that allowing for strategic dele-
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gation of domestic cap selection leads to less stringent caps and higher aggregate emissions
when permit markets are linked. We deliberately focus on effort- and risk-sharing gains to
make a counterpoint and contribute to the literature that finds more positive results due to
linking. For example, Helm & Pichler (2015) find that technology transfers among countries
tend to reduce aggregate emissions when permits are internationally tradable. Additionally,
Holtsmark & Midttømme (2019) show that linking permit markets can induce greater low-
carbon investments and gradually lower emission caps, while Caparrós & Péreau (2017) and
Heitzig & Kornek (2018) discuss models of gradual expansion of linked markets.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and discusses the the-
oretical results. Section 3.1 provides a qualitative illustration in a three-jurisdiction world.
Section 3.2 contains a calibrated quantitative illustration. Section 4 introduces two exten-
sions: endogenous cap selection and intertemporal trading. Section 5 concludes. All num-
bered tables and figures are provided at the end. There are two appendices dealing with the
analytical derivations and proofs (A) and the description of our calibration methodology (B).
2 Model
2.1 Economic environment
To keep the model parsimonious and within the canonical framework, we consider a standard
model of competitive markets for emission permits designed to regulate uniformly-mixed
pollution in several jurisdictions in the manner of Weitzman (1974) and Yohe (1978), or
more recently as in Hoel & Karp (2002), Newell & Pizer (2003, 2008) and Habla & Winkler
(2018). In practice, the canonical framework used in these papers and others implies that we
make three assumptions.
First, markets for permits are analyzed in isolation from the rest of the economy, i.e. inter-
actions with other domestic and international markets through changes in relative prices are
absent. Also absent are the general equilibrium interactions with pre-existing distortionary
tax systems. As highlighted in the Introduction the effects emerging through these channels
can be significant. Second, jurisdictions’ benefits from emissions are expressed as quadratic
functional forms which can be viewed as local approximations of general specifications and
were shown to trace their real-world counterparts well (Klepper & Peterson, 2006; Böhringer
et al., 2014a). Third, uncertainty is introduced in the form of additive shocks affecting juris-
dictions’ unregulated emission levels. Our benchmark model is static and takes jurisdictional
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emissions caps as fixed and independent of the decision to link. In Section 4, we show that
our main results continue to hold in two extensions where we (1) endogenize domestic cap
selection based on self interest in anticipation of linking à la Helm (2003) and (2) allow for
intertemporal trading which interacts with linking in a dynamic multi-period setting.
Jurisdictions There are n jurisdictions and I = {1, . . . , n} denotes the set of jurisdictions.
Aggregate benefits from emissions in jurisdiction i ∈ I are a function of the jurisdiction-wide
emissions level qi ≥ 0 and of the random variable θi such that
Bi(qi; θi) = (βi + θi)qi − q
2
i /(2γi), (1)
where the parameters βi > 0 and γi > 0 control the intercept and slope of i’s linear marginal
benefit schedule, respectively.1 Specifically, the parameter γi reflects i’s abatement technology
at the margin, hereafter technology for short. Thus, when comparing two jurisdictions i and
j, γi > γj means that i has access to a lower-cost abatement technology than j.
Jurisdiction i’s laissez-faire emissions maximize its benefits and are given by
q˜i = γi(βi + θi). (2)
The shock θi thus affects i’s laissez-faire emissions. For analytical convenience and without
loss of generality, we assume that shocks are mean-zero with constant variance and that they
may be correlated across jurisdictions. Specifically, for any pair (i, j) we let
E{θi} = 0, V{θi} = σ
2
i , and Cov{θi; θj} = ρijσiσj with σi ≥ 0 and ρij ∈ [−1; 1]. (3)
For instance, θi > 0 may reflect a favorable shock that increases i’s benefits from emissions,
and therefore, the laissez-faire emissions relative to baseline emissions q¯i = E{q˜i} = γiβi.
Emissions caps The emissions cap profile (ωi)i∈I is exogenous and fixed. Having domestic
caps independent of the decision to link anchors the aggregate level of emissions and rules
out strategic spillovers. This allows us to (1) have well-defined autarky outcomes that serve
as references throughout, (2) isolate the efficiency gains from linkage, and (3) compare these
1Jurisdiction i’s benefits correspond to the aggregate benefits accruing to all firms located within its
boundaries. Indeed, covered firms are all united by a uniform price on emissions, which causes their marginal
benefits to equalize. By horizontal summation, individual marginal benefit curves can thus be combined into
one aggregate marginal benefit curve. Therefore, only the efficiency side of linking is covered here and the
intra-jurisdictional distributional aspects are outside the scope of the paper.
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gains across linkages and jurisdictions in a meaningful way. We later relax this assumption
in Section 4.1 and discuss its implications.
For clarity, we express caps as proportional to technology by an ambition parameter such
that
ωi = αiγi, where αi ∈ (0; βi) for all i ∈ I, (4)
which implies that jurisdictional caps are all – but not equally – stringent relative to baseline.
In particular, notice the negative relationship between αi and the level of ambition implicitly
embedded in i’s domestic cap, i.e. ωi → q¯i when αi → βi.
Autarky equilibria Under autarky, jurisdictions comply with their own caps. We assume
that θi > αi − βi for all i and shock realizations so as to focus on interior autarky equilibria
exclusively. That is, there are weak restrictions on individual shocks such that domestic caps
are always binding. Specifically, autarky permit prices are positive and read
pi = p¯i + θi > 0 for all i ∈ I, (5)
where p¯i = βi−αi > 0 denotes i’s expected autarky price and notice p¯i is lower for jurisdictions
with higher αi.
2 First, note that for a positive (resp. negative) shock realization θi, i’s autarky
price is above (resp. below) p¯i. Second, note that when autarky prices differ – whether it be
due to differences in ambition measured by p¯i or shock realizations – the aggregate abatement
effort is not efficiently allocated among jurisdictions. In particular, cost-efficiency could be
improved by shifting some abatement away from relatively high-ambition (resp. high-shock)
to low-ambition (resp. low-shock) jurisdictions until autarky price differentials are eliminated.
We now characterize and quantify how linkage performs such a function.
2.2 Multilateral linkage and market equilibrium
Let G ⊆ I be a non-empty subset of I. We call G a group and G-linkage the linked permit
market between all jurisdictions in group G. An interior G-linkage equilibrium consists of the
(|G|+1)-tuple (pG, (qG,i)i∈G), where pG is the equilibrium permit price in the linked market and
2Lecuyer & Quirion (2013) and Goodkind & Coggins (2015) provide explicit treatments of corner solutions
in related contexts and demonstrate they can be of importance. Appendix B describing the calibration for
our quantitative illustration shows that the interior equilibria assumption is innocuous for our quantitative
results since p¯i > 2σi for all i ∈ I we study. That is, assuming the shocks are normally distributed, zero-price
corners occur with less than 2.5% probability in autarky and, a fortiori, under linkage.
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qG,i denotes jurisdiction i’s equilibrium level of emissions.
3 The equilibrium is characterized
by the equalization of marginal benefits across jurisdictions in G and market clearing, that is
MBi(qG,i; θi) = βi + θi − qG,i/γi = pG for all i in G, and
∑
i∈G
qG,i = ΩG =
∑
i∈G
ωi, (6)
where ΩG denotes G’s cap. Cost-efficiency requires that any jurisdiction abates in proportion
to its own technology, i.e. q˜i − qG,i = γipG. In particular, the G-linkage equilibrium price can
be expressed as the technology-weighted average of autarky prices, that is
pG = p¯G + ΘˆG, with p¯G =
∑
i∈G
γip¯i/ΓG and ΘˆG =
∑
i∈G
γiθi/ΓG, (7)
where ΓG =
∑
i∈G γi measures G’s technology. Additionally, jurisdictional net permit demands
are proportional to technology and the difference between the autarky and prevailing linking
prices, that is
qG,i − ωi = γi(pi − pG). (8)
In particular, jurisdiction i is a net permit importer (resp. exporter) under G-linkage provided
that pi > pG (resp. pi < pG), i.e. the linking price is lower (resp. higher) than its autarky
price. Ceteris paribus, this shows that G-linkage is observationally equivalent to an increase
(resp. decrease) in i’s effective cap relative to autarky.
2.3 Efficiency gains in multilateral linkages
Because aggregate emissions are invariant, the welfare impacts from linkage only stem from
an improvement in cost-effectiveness, i.e. a reduction in the costs of meeting the group-wide
emissions cap ΩG.
4 Specifically, the economic efficiency gains accruing to i under G-linkage
denoted δG,i correspond to the difference between i’s benefits under G-linkage (inclusive of
3Specifically, we further assume all jurisdictional shocks are bounded from above such that zero-emissions
corners do not occur as a result of a link. In Appendix B, we show that such corners are typically rare since
βi > p¯G + 2V{ΘˆG}
1/2 for all jurisdictions i and groups G we study. Our focus on interior market equilibria
is thus innocuous for our analysis and allows simplification in (1) computing expected gains from linkage as
damages from aggregate emissions are constant and (2) determining the linking price uniquely.
4In Section 4.1, we characterize two additional welfare impacts when domestic caps are endogenous with
the decision to link, namely a strategic effect and a damage effect. Assuming invariant caps shuts down these
two components but is without loss of generality for our characterization of efficiency gains.
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proceeds from permit trading in the linked market) and autarky, that is
δG,i = Bi(qG,i; θi)− pG(qG,i − ωi)−Bi(ωi; θi)
= (qG,i − ωi)
2/(2γi) = γi(pi − pG)
2/2 ≥ 0.
(9)
It is a well-known result that with fixed caps, linkage is mutually beneficial, i.e. efficiency gains
are always non-negative. We characterize these gains further in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under G-linkage, the expected efficiency gains accruing to jurisdiction i ∈ G
can be decomposed into effort- and risk-sharing gains, namely
E{δG,i} = γiE{(pi − pG)
2}/2 = γi
(
E{pi − pG}
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
effort sharing
+V{pi − pG}︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk sharing
)/
2
= γi
(
(p¯i − p¯G)
2 + V{θi − ΘˆG}
)/
2.
(10)
Proof. Relegated to Appendix A.1.
Jurisdiction i’s expected efficiency gains from G-linkage are proportional to the expectation of
the square of the difference in autarky and G-linkage prices, i.e. the square of the distance in
autarky-linking prices.5 Crucially, efficiency gains can be decomposed into two non-negative
components.6
The effort-sharing component is proportional to the square of the expected autarky-linking
price wedge, relates to the intra-group variation in domestic ambition levels (i.e. expected
autarky prices) and is independent of the shock structure. Intuitively, the larger this wedge,
the larger the gains associated with the equalization of jurisdictional marginal benefits on av-
erage. In practice, however, significant disparities in expected autarky prices can compromise
the political feasibility of a link for two reasons. First, they imply sizeable, persistent and
politically-unpalatable monetary transfers associated with permit flows across jurisdictions.
Second, they may connote different preferences in terms of environmental ambition or role
of the carbon price signal as a domestic climate policy instrument.
The risk-sharing component is proportional to the variance of the autarky-linking price wedge,
relates to jurisdictional and G-wide shock characteristics, and is independent of jurisdictions’
5This result is the analog of Proposition 4.1 in Caillaud & Demange (2017). Moreover, note that summing
δG,i = (qG,i − ωi)
2
/(2γi) over i ∈ G and taking expectation yields the aggregate comparative advantage of
decentralization w.r.t. centralization for uniformly-mixed pollutants in Yates (2002).
6Appendix A.1 clarifies the sources of the efficiency gains identified in Proposition 1 by explicitly char-
acterizing the reduction in the costs of emissions control under linking.
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ambition levels.7 That is, provided realized shocks differ across partnering systems, linking
induces a strictly positive gain compared to the case without uncertainty, which is a strict
Pareto-improvement due to risk pooling. Intuitively, controlling for the intra-group variation
in expected autarky prices, the larger the ex-post wedge in autarky and linking prices, the
larger the gains due to risk sharing. For instance, all else equal, i will prefer to be in linkage
groups where the price happens to be high w.r.t. its expectation when i’s (counterfactual)
domestic price would have been low w.r.t. its expectation, and vice versa.
Moreover, because the G-linkage price is the technology-weighted average of autarky prices in
members of G, all else equal, it is primarily driven by jurisdictions with higher γ’s. Similarly,
for jurisdictions of similar technology, it is largely determined by those jurisdictions whose
permit demand is highly variable. Therefore, only considering the risk-sharing component of
gains, one expects that high-γ and high-σ jurisdictions may prefer to link with several juris-
dictions to augment their autarky-linking price distances. By contrast, low-σ (resp. low-γ)
jurisdictions may prefer to link exclusively with a single low-σ (resp. high-γ) jurisdiction, for
otherwise the influence of that jurisdiction on the link outcome is likely to be mitigated. We
further discuss the complex dependence of linkage preferences on the correlation coefficients
in the next section and illustrate it using a qualitative example in Section 3.1.
2.4 Bilateral decomposition of gains in multilateral linkages
Equation (10) offers a compact and intuitive interpretation of jurisdictional gains in terms of
autarky-linking price distance. This clarifies the behavior of the effort-sharing component,
but it remains unclear prima facie how the risk-sharing component relates to jurisdictional
characteristics. To illuminate this further, we unpack Equation (10) and to focus momentarily
on the determinants of the risk-sharing component, we assume identical ambition across
jurisdictions so that autarky-linking price wedges arise only due to shocks, i.e. pi − pG =
θi − ΘˆG. Substituting this into Equation (9) and using the definition of ΘˆG, we obtain
δG,i = γi
(∑
j∈G
γj(θi − θj)
)2/
(2Γ2G). (11)
7In other words, risk-sharing gains are invariant, irrespective of how caps are selected. See Section 4.1.
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Expanding the above and taking expectations then yields
E{δG,i} = γi
(∑
j∈G
γ2j (σ
2
i + σ
2
j − 2ρijσiσj)
+
∑
(j,k)∈G2
γjγk(σ
2
i + ρjkσjσk − ρikσiσk − ρijσiσj)
)/
(2Γ2G).
(12)
For clarity of interpretation, we first consider the most elementary group G = {i, j}, i.e. a
bilateral linkage. Letting ∆{i,j} = δ{i,j},i + δ{i,j},j denote the aggregate economic gains from
{i, j}-linkage, Equation (12) simplifies and gives
E{∆{i,j}} = γiγj(σ
2
i + σ
2
j − ρijσiσj)/(2Γ{i,j}) ≥ 0, and (13a)
E{δ{i,j},i}/E{δ{i,j},j} = γj/γi. (13b)
Intuitively and as described further in Doda & Taschini (2017), the aggregate risk-sharing
gains from {i, j}-linkage are (1) positive as long as jurisdictional shocks are imperfectly corre-
lated and jurisdictional volatility levels differ, for otherwise the two jurisdictions are identical
in terms of shock characteristics, (2) increasing in both jurisdictional volatilities and technol-
ogy parameters, (3) higher the more weakly correlated jurisdictional shocks are, and (4) for
a given group’s technology, maximal when jurisdictions have identical technology. Addition-
ally, note that aggregate gains are apportioned between jurisdictions in inverse proportion to
technology parameters. This is so because, for a given volume of trade, the distance between
the autarky and linking prices is greater in the higher-cost technology jurisdiction.
Returning to the general case of any G-linkage, we could pursue a similar approach to compute
E{δG,i} as i’s expected gains from a bilateral linkage between i and G\{i}. However, the
nature of the entity G\{i} becomes exceedingly complex as the cardinality of G increases.
In this respect, one of our contributions is to recognize that bilateral linkages constitute the
building blocks of the multilateral linkage analysis. Specifically, in a given linkage group,
we show that it is more convenient to express the associated quantities as a function of the
group’s internal bilateral linkage quantities. With the tacit convention that ∆{i,i} = 0 for
any i, we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Any G-linkage can be decomposed into its internal bilateral linkages. That is,
G-linkage gains (inclusive of both effort- and risk-sharing components) accruing to jurisdiction
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i ∈ G write as function of the aggregate gains in all bilateral linkages within G
δG,i =
∑
j∈G\{i}
{
ΓG\{i}Γ{i,j}∆{i,j} − (γi/2)
∑
k∈G\{i}
Γ{j,k}∆{j,k}
}/
Γ2G. (14)
The number of such internal bilateral links is triangular and equals
(
|G|+1
2
)
.
Proof. Relegated to Appendix A.2.
Proposition 2 helps us tease out jurisdictional linkage preferences. Specifically, jurisdiction
i is better off linking with sets of jurisdictions such that on the one hand, the aggregate
gains in bilateral links between i and each jurisdiction in these sets are high, and on the
other hand, the aggregate gains in bilateral links internal to these sets are low. Referring to
the above description of the determinants of the risk-sharing gains in bilateral links, these
desirable sets, from the perspective of i, should comprise of jurisdictions that are similar to
each other, with higher σ and γ than i, and negatively correlated with i. At the extreme
and considering only the risk-sharing component of gains, i would ideally like to link with as
many replicas of its most preferred bilateral linking partner as possible.
Additionally, summing Equation (14) over all i ∈ G gives
∆G =
∑
i∈G
δG,i =
∑
(i,j)∈G2
Γ{i,j}∆{i,j}/(2ΓG). (15)
In words, the aggregate G-linkage gains write as a technology-weighted sum of all gains from
bilateral linkages within G. This decomposition result permits a more practical formulation
and quantification of gains generated by an arbitrarily large group. Moreover, it allows us
to provide an intuitive description of the efficiency gains in linking disjoint groups of linked
jurisdictions. Specifically, let G ′ ⊂ G and G ′′ be the complement of G ′ in G, i.e. G = G ′ ∪ G ′′
and G ′ ∩ G ′′ = ∅. Then, we can express the aggregate gains in G as a function of those in G ′
and G ′′ by unpacking Equation (15), that is
∆G =
(
ΓG′∆G′ + ΓG′′∆G′′ +
∑
(i,j)∈G′×G′′
Γ{i,j}∆{i,j}
)/
ΓG. (16)
Note that the third term in the parenthesis captures the interaction among jurisdictions in G ′
and G ′′, which is precisely the quantity we want to isolate. To do so, we denote the aggregate
gains of merging groups G ′ and G ′′ by ∆{G′,G′′} and define them by ∆{G′,G′′} = ∆G−∆G′−∆G′′ .
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With this definition, Appendix A.3 shows that
E{∆{G′,G′′}} =
( ∑
(i,j)∈G′×G′′
Γ{i,j}E{∆{i,j}} − ΓG′′E{∆G′} − ΓG′E{∆G′′}
)/
ΓG ≥ 0, (17)
which is non-negative given the mutually beneficial nature of linkage with fixed caps. That is,
the aggregate expected gains from the union of disjoint groups is no less than the sum of the
separate groups’ aggregate expected gains.8 This implies the standard result that I-linkage
– the global market – is the linkage arrangement that is conducive to the highest aggregate
cost savings in complying with the aggregate cap ΩI .
2.5 Risk-sharing and permit price properties under linkage
The G-linkage price pG = p¯G + ΘˆG is composed of two terms. The former, p¯G = E{pG} =∑
i∈G γip¯i/ΓG, is commensurate with the stringency of the group-wide cap relative to base-
line emissions. It measures the marginal cost of abatement when the group-wide expected
abatement effort is allocated cost-efficiently. The latter, ΘˆG =
∑
i∈G γiθi/ΓG, quantifies the
price impact due to the variability of the stringency of the group’s cap relative to laissez-faire
emissions that would be consistent with a profile of realized shocks. Indeed, given (θi)i∈G, the
quantity
∑
i∈G γiθi measures the difference in the group’s laissez-faire and baseline emissions.
Then, dividing it by the group-wide technology ΓG gives the corresponding price impact.
Next, we characterize the features of linkage in terms of risk-sharing by analyzing the proper-
ties of the linking permit price variability. As defined formally in Appendix A.4, a partition
P ′ of I is coarser than a partition P if P ′ can be obtained from P by some sequence of linkages
between groups in P .9 With this terminology we can then state the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Linkage reduces permit price volatility on average in groups and partitions,
but not necessarily for each of their member jurisdictions. That is,
(a) Linkage diversifies risk since for any group G and partitions (P ,P ′) with P ′ coarser than
P, we have ΓGV{pG}
1/2 ≤
∑
i∈G γiV{pi}
1/2 and
∑
G∈P ′ ΓGV{pG}
1/2 ≤
∑
G∈P ΓGV{pG}
1/2.
(b) Under G-linkage, only when shocks are independent does it hold that p-lim|G|→+∞pG = p¯G.
In particular, relative to autarky, linkage always reduces price volatility in higher volatility
8Specifically, linkage is superadditive given fixed caps. In a related context, Proposition 2 in Hennessy &
Roosen (1999) shows that merging firms covered under a permit market is superadditive but an analytical
description of the gains as in Equation (17) is not provided.
9By way of example, consider that P = {G1, . . . ,G6} with
⋃6
i=1 Gi = I. Then P
′ = {G1 ∪ G2,G3, . . . ,G6}
and P ′′ = {G1 ∪ G2 ∪ G3,G4,G5 ∪ G6} are both coarser than P, and P
′′ is also a coarsening of P ′.
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jurisdictions but may increase it in lower volatility jurisdictions.
Proof. Relegated to Appendix A.4.
Statement (a) indicates that linkage improves shock absorption and reduces price volatility
on average relative to autarky. In a given group, the linking price volatility is smaller than
the technology-weighted average of autarky price volatilities. That is, the variability of the
group’s cap stringency is less than the one implied by its members’ individual cap stringencies
taken together. Importantly, this property extends to partitions: the coarser a partition, the
more diversified the domestic shocks on average. Obviously, on the flip side, linking implies
that relative to autarky jurisdictional emission levels are uncertain and contingent on own
and linkage partners’ shock realizations. This, however, can be desirable as it dampens the
impact of domestic shocks much like a supply-side control in an hybrid instrument does by
introducing some responsiveness in domestic caps.10
Although linkage-induced diversification guarantees that price volatility is reduced on aver-
age in a group, Statement (b) indicates that (1) enlarging a group does not always imply lower
price variability, which would be true only if domestic shocks were independent and (2) not
every member jurisdiction necessarily experiences a reduction in price volatility w.r.t. au-
tarky. On the one hand, relatively volatile jurisdictions always experience reduced price
volatility w.r.t. autarky as domestic shocks are spread over a thicker market and thus better
cushioned. On the other hand, because linkage also creates exposure to foreign shocks, rela-
tively stable jurisdictions may face higher volatility relative to autarky. We emphasize that
linkage is always preferred to autarky even when it leads to higher price variability domesti-
cally, i.e. despite the fact that a jurisdiction might ‘import’ additional volatility as a result of
the link. This holds because jurisdictional regulators are risk-neutral and because domestic
and foreign shocks are of a fundamental nature, i.e. they lead to permit price differences, the
elimination of which is the very source of efficiency gains.
10In the normative framework of instrument selection, much has been written about the problem of
perfectly inelastic permit supply since the seminal contribution by Roberts & Spence (1976) and, in general,
hybrid instruments have been shown to outperform both pure price and pure quantity instruments. In our
setup linking increases the price elasticity of permit demand whereas a hybrid instrument increases the price
elasticity of permit supply, typically by introducing steps in supply curves, see e.g. Fell et al. (2012a).
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3 Illustrations
3.1 Qualitative illustration
In this section we illustrate our theoretical results in a stylized setup with three jurisdictions
i, j and k. Taking jurisdiction i’s perspective, we compare its linkage options graphically in
Figure 1. Throughout we assume that jurisdictions have identical ambition levels, i.e. au-
tarky permit prices are equal in expectation across jurisdictions, and effort-sharing gains are
thus nil. The calibrated quantitative illustration in Section 3.2 relaxes this assumption and
provides monetary evaluations of both effort- and risk-sharing gains.
We start by describing the key features of Figure 1. The axes are the same across the panels
of the figure and measure γj and γk with respect to the innocuous normalization γi = 1. The
dot in the center of each panel identifies the point where the jurisdictions’ technologies are
identical, i.e. γi = γj = γk = 1. Throughout we also refer to the case where σi = σj = σk > 0
and ρij = ρik = ρjk = 0 as the symmetric uncertainty benchmark (SUB).
In Panel 1a we rule out the possibility of all three jurisdictions linking together, i.e. {i, j, k},
to focus on the simpler case of i’s possible bilateral linkage groups, namely {i, j} and {i, k}.
In this case, the 45o line depicts the indifference frontier along which {i, j} and {i, k} generate
the same risk-sharing gains for i.11 Above the frontier i prefers to link with k because k has
a lower-cost abatement technology than j does. All else constant, deviations from SUB such
as σi = σj < σk or ρij = 0 > ρik distort the indifference frontier to the dashed curve. These
deviations imply that k is i’s preferred partner in a larger region of the {γj, γk}-space.
In Panel 1b we revert back to SUB but now allow for the formation of {i, j, k} in addition to
the bilateral links just discussed. First, observe that at the point of identical technologies,
i prefers {i, j, k} to the bilateral linkages. This is to be expected because with j and k ex
ante identical, {i, j, k} is twice as large as the bilateral groups i could form and therefore
offers more abatement opportunities ex post.12 Now note that i’s indifference point between
{i, j, k} and bilateral linkages (denoted by a diamond) implies γi < γj = γk. Indeed, given
the restrictions implicit in SUB, it must be that j and k can each offer sufficiently cheaper
abatement opportunities to i to render bilateral linkages at least as rewarding as {i, j, k}.
Second, deviations from SUB which do not break symmetry between j and k would move
the point of indifference along the 45o line. For example, σi < σj = σk would move the point
11The analytical expressions for the indifference frontiers are available from the authors upon request.
12See Doda & Taschini (2017) for a discussion of the effects of market size on risk-sharing gains.
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of indifference northeast, thereby expanding the region in which {i, j, k} is the preferred
option symmetrically around the 45o line, and vice versa. Additionally, Panel 1c shows the
implications of breaking the symmetry implicit in SUB. The case depicted in this panel
distorts the indifference frontier in favor of the bilateral group {i, k} which is consistent with
deviations from SUB such that σi = σj < σk or ρik < ρij = ρjk = 0.
Finally, it is informative to characterize j and k’s linkage preferences in the same {γj, γk}-
space. Panel 1d superimposes the linkage indifference frontiers for the three jurisdictions
under SUB. The dark grey area at the center represents the zone where {i, j, k} is simul-
taneously preferred by all three jurisdictions and should thus endogenously emerge. Here,
{i, j, k} is every jurisdiction’s best option only when the technology parameters γj and γk do
not deviate much from γi. Under more general conditions than under SUB, it is not clear
prima facie whether jurisdictional characteristics are such that {i, j, k} is the most preferred
linkage option for all jurisdictions simultaneously.
The light grey areas at the top and in the southwest corners of Panel 1d represent the zones
where i and k respectively prefer {i, k}-linkage the most. These zones do not overlap, so
{i, k}-linkage cannot form endogenously without compensatory transfers. More generally,
if jurisdictional linkage preferences are not aligned, in the sense that there is at least one
jurisdiction whose most preferred option is not {i, j, k}, then we can show that a jurisdiction’s
most preferred group cannot simultaneously be the favourite of every other jurisdiction in that
group.13 Only inter-jurisdictional transfers could change this. In a world where transfers often
face significant political-economy obstacles and thereby prove unwieldy, this non-alignment
result can in part explain why linkage negotiations do not readily deliver large linkage groups.
3.2 Quantitative illustration
In this section we explore our model quantitatively by considering linkages between hypothet-
ical ETSs regulating the CO2 emissions from the power sector of five real-world jurisdictions
with different levels of ambition and which are subject to different shocks. We assume annual
compliance without permit banking and borrowing across compliance periods and compute
the annual effort- and risk-sharing gains implied by our model.14
13See Appendix A.5 for a proof in the general case.
14Section 4.2 provides an extension to study the attenuation in both effort- and risk-sharing gains due to
linking when unrestricted intertemporal trading is allowed for the empirically relevant parameter values.
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Data description, model calibration and caveats We provide an overview of our
calibration strategy, which is detailed in Appendix B. We focus on five jurisdictions with
similar levels of development and which all use, or have considered, both emissions trading and
linking: Australia (AUS), Canada (CAN), the European Union (EUR), South Korea (KOR)
and the United States (USA). We obtained estimates of the annual baseline emissions and
marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) for the power sector of these jurisdictions in 2030
from Enerdata, a private research and consulting firm whose clients include several national
governments, UNDP and the European Commission. Based on the Ener-Blue scenario of the
POLES model, the company also provided us with its estimates of the annual emission caps
consistent with the achievement of the 2030 targets defined in the Nationally Determined
Contributions as announced at the Conference of Parties in Paris.
Equipped with these caps and MACCs, we compute the expected autarky permit prices
using our model which range from 27.1$/tCO2 in AUS to 113.7$/tCO2 in CAN. The annual
baselines (q¯i), emission caps (ωi) and corresponding expected autarky permit prices (p¯i) are
reported in Table 1, which also contains the linear intercepts (βi) and technology coefficients
(γi) we calibrate with a linear interpolation of MACCs in the vicinity of domestic caps.
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We calibrate the shock properties using the residuals from the regression of historical emis-
sions on time and time squared with data from the International Energy Agency. These
shocks capture the net effect of stochastic factors that may influence emissions and their
associated benefits, e.g. business cycles, TFP shocks, jurisdiction-specific events, changes in
prices of factors of production, weather fluctuations, etc. Table 2 provides the volatility of
the autarky permit prices as measured by the coefficient of variation, as well as the pairwise
shock correlations implied by our theory. We note that there is large cross-jurisdiction vari-
ation in autarky price variability and that there are instances where the correlation between
shocks is negative (e.g. KOR and EUR) or effectively zero (e.g. KOR and CAN).
Before proceeding to a discussion of our results, we point out a number of theoretical and
quantitative caveats. Theoretically, all strategic and general equilibrium considerations which
have a bearing on the costs of linking, and therefore are relevant for the equilibrium cap levels
or optimal emissions, are left out by construction. In other words, our partial equilibrium
approach does not account for the welfare impact of changes in relative prices within (say due
to changes in power prices) and across (say due to changes in terms of trade) jurisdictions.
15The parameter γi compounds the productivity of i’s abatement technology and i’s volume of regulated
emissions. As such, comparing the ratios γi/q¯i can give us a sense of the ordering of the volume-adjusted
costs of abatement opportunities at the margin in the vicinity of the domestic caps. For instance, Table 1
shows that AUS has the cheapest abatement opportunities whereas the most expensive ones are in EUR.
18
Also, absent are potentially amplified/diminished distortions in labor and capital markets.
Quantitatively, the POLES model of Enerdata is in essence a black box for us but we take its
results as given. Accordingly, our quantitative results are sensitive to the assumptions of that
model and its Ener-Blue scenario, particularly regarding the productivity and availability of
abatement technologies in 2030 which determine our jurisdictions’ marginal benefit schedules.
Finally, we limit the analysis to the power sector due to data and cost constraints. This is the
most natural and relevant sector to consider as it consists of large stationary sources which
are easy to regulate, thus always brought under ETS regulations first. Bringing in additional
sectors would imply some degree of intra-jurisdictional effort and risk sharing which could
reduce efficiency gains from inter-jurisdictional trading despite a larger market size overall.
These caveats imply that the per-annum efficiency gains computed below should be taken as
illustrative upper bounds and with a large grain of salt.
Discussion Thanks to the bilateral decomposition result in Proposition 2 we can adopt
a combinatorial approach to quantifying the annual monetary gains, in constant 2005US$,
accruing to every jurisdiction in every possible linkage group.
Proposition 1 shows the jurisdictional gains are composed of an effort-sharing component and
a risk-sharing component. These are illustrated in Figure 2 using three possible partitions
of the set of five jurisdictions. We denote them 5J (top panel) when all five jurisdictions
are linked together, and 2J3J (middle panel) and 2J3J (bottom panel) which generate the
greatest and smallest gains among the ten possible partitions where no individual jurisdic-
tion is in autarky. 2J3J and 2J3J are given by {{AUS,USA}, {CAN,EUR,KOR}} and
{{AUS,EUR}, {CAN,KOR,USA}}. The figure shows (1) how a group’s gains are shared
among the member jurisdictions and (2) the sources of gains for each jurisdiction. The areas
of the various rectangles are comparable throughout, and proportional to the magnitude of
the gains.16 The colors identify jurisdictions and shades of a color distinguish the effort-
sharing (light) and risk-sharing (dark) gains. The dotted areas in the panels for 2J3J and
2J3J illustrate the foregone gains with respect to 5J .
In 5J the aggregate effort-sharing gains amount to $1.58 billion, and those associated with
risk sharing are $1.68 billion, totalling $3.26 billion. Risk sharing is the dominant source
of gains in all jurisdictions but AUS. At $1.38 billion AUS’s effort-sharing gains account for
almost 90% of aggregate effort-sharing gains. This is not surprising because the expected
16The small squares are an exception, e.g. KOR’s effort-sharing gains in 5J , and indicate gains too small
to be visible in the graph.
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autarky-linking price wedge in AUS is the largest ($27.1 vs $86.5 per tCO2). Conversely,
EUR captures the largest risk-sharing gains which amount to $0.62 billion or just over a
third of the aggregate risk-sharing gains.
The sum of the efficiency gains generated in {AUS,USA} and {CAN,EUR,KOR} of 2J3J
are smaller than 5J ’s by about 14%, or $0.45 billion. Most of the loss is due to the decline in
the risk-sharing gains. The expected linking prices are given by $84.1 and $93.0, respectively.
The largest effort-sharing gains among all possible bilateral links occur in {AUS,USA} which
is about 90% of effort-sharing gains in 5J . This is true despite the fact that the expected
autarky price difference between AUS ($27.1) and CAN ($113.7) is greater because assuming
similar abatement technologies USA is a much larger market than CAN. Were AUS and CAN
to link their markets, the expected linking price would be too low ($45.4) relative to that in
{AUS,USA} and result in significant effort-sharing gains going unrealized. Of course, effort-
sharing gains are only part of the story and the figure shows the risk-sharing gains generated
in {AUS,USA} are small. Similarly, the risk-sharing gains generated in {CAN,EUR,KOR},
although sizable, are smaller than those in 5J . This is because the absence of AUS and USA
from this group reduces risk diversification opportunities significantly.
The groups {AUS,EUR} and {CAN,KOR,USA} in 2J3J generate low effort-sharing gains
as evidenced by the large difference between the groups’ expected linking prices, $66.4 and
$93.5, respectively; and low risk-sharing gains by grouping positively correlated jurisdictions
together and thereby forgoing the opportunity of leveraging the negative correlation between
EUR and KOR. Together, these two linking groups imply that almost 40%, or $1.25 billion,
worth of efficiency gains go unrealized relative to 5J .
After illustrating the group-wide gains and how they are distributed across jurisdictions and
across effort- and risk-sharing in three select partitions, we now take an individual jurisdic-
tion’s perspective and discuss efficiency gains and permit price volatility it may expect in all
groups where it is a member. The three panels of Figure 3 use USA as an example. The top
and middle panels show the efficiency gains for USA and permit price volatility as a function
of the number of members in the group.
First, observe that 5J is not the group that generates the largest gains for USA. In light
of the previous section, we conclude that 5J will therefore not emerge naturally for these
five jurisdictions, even though it would generate the largest gains in aggregate. Neither is it
the case that 5J delivers the lowest price volatility for USA which obtains in the bilateral
link with EUR. In fact, USA permit price volatility may increase relative to its autarky level
(horizontal line in the middle panel). However, we emphasize that in our model an increase
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in permit price volatility relative to autarky does not have any negative implications, which
for many jurisdictions in the real world can be an important consideration.
Second, there is not a monotonic relationship between the magnitude of efficiency gains and
cardinality of a group. For example, adding EUR to {AUS,USA} increases USA’s efficiency
gains while adding KOR or CAN decreases them. Third, linkage preferences do not tally.
While USA would gain the more from adding EUR to {AUS,USA}, AUS would rather have
KOR or CAN join the bilateral group next as it would benefit AUS more.
Finally, the bottom panel illustrates the large variation in the two components of gains across
groups including USA which are ordered so risk-sharing gains decline along the x-axis. In all
groups where AUS is a member, USA enjoys significant effort-sharing gains driven by the large
difference in expected autarky prices between AUS and the others. In groups with greater
number of members, USA effort-sharing gains tend to be lower as they are more diluted
across jurisdictions relative to {AUS,USA}. Risk-sharing gains also vary significantly across
all groups. USA efficiency gains consist almost exclusively of risk-sharing gains in groups that
do not include AUS (e.g. {EUR,KOR,USA}) and may be larger than effort-sharing gains in
groups that do include it (e.g. {AUS,EUR,USA}). These observations underline the need for
a model to evaluate the efficiency gains from linking ETSs multilaterally.
4 Extensions
4.1 Linking with endogenous cap selection
Our analysis of linkage in Section 2 assumes away strategic cap selection and takes domestic
caps as given. This can be justified by reference to the domestic political-economy constraints
that emerge from the complex internal negotiation processes which must render the resulting
policies acceptable to a host of actors with divergent interests, see e.g. Flachsland et al. (2009).
Deviating from one’s cap is therefore costly. However, one may contend that the prospects
of inter-jurisdictional permit trading will drive regulators to set their caps in anticipation of
linking based on self interest.
In this case, Helm (2003) showed that jurisdictions which expect to be net sellers (resp. buy-
ers) of permits on the linked market have an incentive to inflate (resp. reduce) their caps
relative to autarky to maximize their gains from linking. This strategic aspect and attendant
shift in aggregate emissions and damages imply additional welfare impacts which in turn
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could compromise the feasibility of linkage, and autarky may even welfare-dominate linkage.
At a minimum, jurisdictional linkage preferences may be altered. Below we analyze how
endogenizing cap selection affects our analysis of linkage.
In what follows, we make the conventional assumption that marginal damages are constant
and let ηi denote i’s marginal damage (Pizer, 2002; Newell & Pizer, 2003). This assumption
is consistent with damages being determined by the global cumulative emissions since the
beginning of the Industrial Revolution (Allen et al., 2009; Allen, 2016). Here, it implies
that jurisdictional reaction functions are orthogonal. We also assume that domestic caps are
selected non-cooperatively with Cournot-Nash conjectural variations.17
Under autarky jurisdiction i sets its cap ωA,i to maximize its benefits net of damages, which
simply yields ωA,i = γi(βi−ηi), i.e. p¯A,i = ηi. This reflects the weak form of the international
free-riding problem, i.e. the intercepts of the reaction functions imply higher emission levels
than in the global optimum, as i does not internalize the negative externality inflicted by its
emissions upon others.18 Socially-efficient caps satisfy the Lindahl-Samuelson condition, are
lower than the Cournot-Nash ones and imply all jurisdictions face the same price p¯I =
∑
i∈I ηi
in expectation, which is congruent with a global social cost of carbon (Kotchen, 2018).
Under G-linkage, endogenizing cap selection is congruent with a two-stage game where juris-
dictions set their caps at stage one and inter-jurisdictional permit trading occurs at stage two,
which is typically solved in subgame Nash perfection using backward induction (D’Aspremont
et al., 1983). As shown in Appendix A.6 jurisdiction i’s cap in anticipation of G-linkage be-
comes
ωG,i = (ΓG − γi)(〈η〉G − ηi) + ωA,i ≥ ωA,i ⇔ ηi ≤ 〈η〉G, (18)
where 〈η〉G =
∑
i∈G ηi/|G| is the average marginal damage in G. Under the prospects of form-
ing a linkage group the weak form of the free-riding problem is magnified (resp. mitigated)
for relatively low-damage (resp. high-damage) jurisdictions and in turn, inter-jurisdictional
permit trading has an ambiguous effect on aggregate pollution relative to autarky since
∑
i∈G
[ωG,i − ωA,i] =
∑
i∈G
γi(ηi − 〈η〉G) ≷ 0, (19)
17If caps are selected cooperatively within a group, the prospects of inter-jurisdictional trading are inconse-
quential for cap selection (Carbone et al., 2009). Our results would be qualitatively similar under alternative
conjectural variations because marginal damages are constant (MacKenzie, 2011; Gelves & McGinty, 2016).
18Due to the linearity of damages our framework does not capture its strong form, i.e. the crowding-out
of domestic abatement efforts (reaction functions are negatively sloped with quadratic damages) which will
always be strategic substitutes in a pure emissions game.
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whose sign depends on the distributions of the ηi’s and γi’s.
19 In fact, there is no consensus
in the literature on this matter. For instance, Holtsmark & Sommervoll (2012) and Lapan &
Sikdar (2019) show that linkage increases aggregate emissions relative to autarky absent and
present trade in other goods, respectively. Using a computable general equilibrium model,
Carbone et al. (2009) show that the opposite situation is more likely to occur.
The equilibrium market price under G-linkage with endogenous cap selection reads
p∗G = 〈η〉G + ΘˆG. (20)
Note that the G-linkage prices with fixed and endogenous caps in Equations (7) and (20)
are identical up to a shift in their deterministic parts from
∑
i∈G γip¯i/ΓG to
∑
i∈G p¯A,i/|G| and
that i is a net seller in expectation i.f.f. ηi ≤ 〈η〉G. Because endogenous cap selection does
not alter price variability, it will a fortiori not affect risk-sharing gains from linkage. Specif-
ically, Helm (2003) shows that with endogenous caps the welfare impacts from linkage can
be decomposed into three components, namely the efficiency gains from inter-jurisdictional
trading, the strategic effect as measured by the market value of the difference in cap choices
under autarky and linking, and the damage effect of changes in aggregate emissions. In the
following proposition, we offer a precise analytical characterization of these three components.
Proposition 4. With endogenous cap selection, the expected welfare impacts from G-linkage
in jurisdiction i can be decomposed into three components
E{δ∗i,G} =γi
( effort sharing≥ 0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(ηi − 〈η〉G)
2 +
risk sharing≥ 0︷ ︸︸ ︷
V{θi − ΘˆG}
)/
2
+ 〈η〉G(ΓG − γi)(〈η〉G − ηi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
strategic effect≷ 0
+ ηi
∑
j∈G
γj(〈η〉G − ηj)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
damage effect≷ 0
≷ 0.
(21)
Proof. Relegated to Appendix A.6.
As with exogenous caps in Proposition 1, efficiency gains have effort-sharing and risk-sharing
subcomponents, which are both non-negative. Observe that the latter is independent of cap
selection which justifies our focus on exogenous caps in Section 2. That said, the interplay
between the three welfare components is intricate and the latter two effects can be positive or
negative. The strategic effect is positive iff ηi < 〈η〉G while the damage effect is proportional
19For instance, if ηi = ηγi for all i then Equation (19) reduces to η
∑
(i,j)∈G2(γi−γj)
2/(2|G|) ≥ 0 but note
that this result is reversed if we assume ηi = η/γi for all i instead.
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to the variation in aggregate emissions between autarky and linkage and thus hard to sign.
Hence, with endogenous cap selection the net welfare effect of linkage is ambiguous and the
literature is again not decisive on this matter. With partial equilibrium models, Godal &
Holtsmark (2011) and Holtsmark & Sommervoll (2012) find that linkage is unlikely to yield
welfare gains while Dijkstra et al. (2011) and Antoniou et al. (2014) find just the opposite.
With general equilibrium models, Marschinski et al. (2012) and Böhringer et al. (2014a) show
that linkage-induced effects on welfare are ambiguous in general.
The above establishes the validity of our central result, namely Proposition 1, under strategic
selection of domestic caps in anticipation of linking. In passing, we note that Proposition 3
on the stochastic properties of permit prices is also unaltered, but that Proposition 2, which
provides an alternative formulation of individual efficiency gains, no longer holds.
4.2 Linking with banking and borrowing
Most if not all emissions trading systems allow for some form of intertemporal trading, that
is banking issued permits for future compliance or borrowing future permits for present
compliance. In Section 2, we abstracted from banking and borrowing when characterizing
efficiency gains due to linking. By providing emitters with the opportunity to rearrange
emissions over time, intertemporal trading can in principle reduce the price variability under
autarky which in turn should shrink the risk pooling potential left over to linkage. In this
section, we quantify the size and determinants of the efficiency gains due to linking with
unrestricted intertemporal trading. We find that banking and borrowing does not eliminate
the efficiency gains due to linking, and in some cases may increase them. The result turns
on the persistence of shocks over time, the discount factor and the planning horizon.
For simplicity, we consider a stylized model of unrestricted banking and borrowing, which ab-
stracts from constraints on the amount of permits that can be banked or borrowed. Without
loss of generality, we assume jurisdictions apply the same discount factor λ and that their ben-
efit functions are time invariant. Additionally, given our discussion in the previous section,
we revert to exogenous caps and further assume they are constant over time. Allowing for
intertemporal trading alters market equilibrium permit prices but crucially not the definition
of per-period linkage gains in Equation (14). In a given group G and period t we denote by
p⋆G,t and pG,t the prices with and without intertemporal trading, respectively.
20 Substituting
20Period length is deliberately left unspecified and need only coincide with any multiple of a given com-
pliance period length, usually a year.
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them into (14) then gives the corresponding linkage gains, which we respectively denote by
δ⋆i,G,t and δi,G,t. For instance, δ
⋆
i,G,t = γi(p
⋆
i,t− p
⋆
G,t)
2/2 ≥ 0. That is, allowing for intertemporal
trading alters, but does not neutralize, the efficiency gains from inter-jurisdictional trading.
Below, we characterize δ⋆i,G,t as well as the ordering of δ
⋆
i,G,t and δi,G,t.
Consider two adjacent time periods t and t+1. We let θi,t and θi,t+1 denote the corresponding
shocks in jurisdiction i and assume that unconditional expectations are normalized to zero,
i.e. E{θi,t} = E{θi,t+1} = 0. To specify the expectation of θi,t+1 conditional on θi,t we assume
that the joint distribution of (θi,t, θi,t+1) follows a standard AR(1) process. That is, using
the shorthand notation Et{·} to denote expectation conditional on all information available
at period t, Et{θi,t+1} = ϕiθi,t where ϕi ∈ [−1; 1] denotes the shock persistence.
Under autarky, the permit price in jurisdiction i in period t without intertemporal trading is
simply given by Equation (5), i.e. pi,t = p¯i + θi,t. With intertemporal trading, the standard
no-arbitrage condition with discounting and uncertainty (Samuelson, 1971; Schennach, 2000)
is satisfied
p⋆i,t = MBi(qi,t; θi,t) = λEt{MBi(qi,t+1; θi,t+1)} = λEt{p
⋆
i,t+1}. (22)
That is, the discounted permit price is a martingale. Additionally, invoking the tower rule,
Equation (22) can be chained over time with any given horizon of length h ∈ N yielding
p⋆i,t = MBi(qi,t; θi,t) = λEt{MBi(qi,t+1; θi,t+1)} = · · · = λ
h
Et{MBi(qi,t+h; θi,t+h)}. (23)
We can solve for the period-t equilibrium price and expected price path with intertemporal
trading over the horizon h using Equation (23) and overall market closure at t+ h, yielding
Et{p
⋆
i,t+z} = λ
−zp⋆i,t for any z ∈ [[0;h]] with p
⋆
i,t =
(
(h+ 1)p¯i + θi,tΦi
)/
Λ, (24)
where Φi =
∑h
z=0 ϕ
z
i and Λ =
∑h
z=0 λ
−z, and which reduces to p⋆i,t = pi,t only when ϕi = 1 and
λ = 1.21 When λ < 1, the deterministic part of p⋆i,t is smaller than that of pi,t due to temporal
effort sharing. In practice, some abatement is postponed because (h + 1)/Λ decreases with
h and λ−1.22 Not surprisingly, intertemporal trading reduces price variability because
V{p⋆i,t} = (Φi/Λ)
2
V{pi,t} ≤ V{pi,t}, (25)
21We assume that the permit bank carried into t from t− 1, bi,t−1, is zero for simplicity and without loss
of generality. Accounting for past banking only introduces an offset in the certain component of p⋆i,t and thus
leaves risk-sharing gains and the martingale property unchanged, see Equation (A.39) in Appendix A.7.
22Similarly to linking, intertemporal trading generates effort and risk sharing gains. In a deterministic
setting, temporal vs. spatial effort sharing gains have been analyzed, see e.g. Stevens & Rose (2002).
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since Φi/Λ ≤ 1 with equality only when ϕi = 1 and λ = 1, or when h = 0. Given the
properties of Φi/Λ, (1) the greater the shock persistence, the less intertemporal trading can
dampen the price impact of shocks;23 (2) the longer the time horizon, the more jurisdictions
have flexibility to spread out shocks over time, resulting in lower price variability today; and
(3) the lower the discount factor, the less marked the price impact of shocks today as firms
prefer to pass on more of the shocks to future periods. Only in the limit as h→∞ or λ→ 0
is price variability nil and the intertemporally tradable quantity instrument closely mimics
the outcomes of a price instrument.24 That is, unrestricted banking and borrowing alone
cannot in general absorb all contemporaneous price variability.25
Similarly, the G-linkage equilibrium price in period t without intertemporal trading is given
by Equation (7), i.e. pG,t = p¯G +
∑
i∈G γiθi,t/ΓG, whereas with intertemporal trading it reads
p⋆G,t =
(
(h+ 1)p¯G +
∑
i∈G
γiθi,tΦi/ΓG
)/
Λ, (26)
and in expectation grows at the discount rate λ−1 − 1 over the horizon h. This implies that
the static analysis of efficiency gains in Section 2 remains valid with intertemporal trading if
shocks are rescaled by Φi/Λ to account for optimal, unlimited banking and borrowing. We
can then state the following proposition.
Proposition 5. With unrestricted intertemporal trading over a finite time horizon of length
h, the efficiency gains due to G-linkage accruing to jurisdiction i in any period t amount to
E{δ⋆i,G,t} = γi
(
(h+ 1)2(p¯i − p¯G)
2/Λ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
effort sharing
+V{θ⋆i,t − Θˆ
⋆
G,t}︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk sharing
)/
2 ≷ E{δi,G,t}, (27)
where Θˆ⋆G,t =
∑
i∈G γiθ
⋆
i,t/ΓG and θ
⋆
i,t = θi,tΦi/Λ, with Φi =
∑h
z=0 ϕ
z
i and Λ =
∑h
z=0 λ
−z.
Proof. Relegated to Appendix A.7
Proposition 5 extends Proposition 1 to a dynamic setup where, in addition to linking, un-
23This is not mathematically precise but conveys the core intuition. See Appendix A.7 for details.
24In a seminal paper comparing price and quantity instruments for stock pollutants, Newell & Pizer (2003)
hint at this result (see their footnote 7) but do not develop it formally as their analysis abstracts from banking
and borrowing. Extensions with intertemporal trading quantify further quantify this result, see equation 9 in
Fell et al. (2012b) or Newell et al. (2005) and Pizer & Prest (2016) for a particular focus on policy updating.
25Moreover, comparing Equations (7) and (24) shows that, from the perspective of i intertemporal trading
is observationally equivalent to linking with h uncorrelated replicas of i whose individual shocks are given
by {θi,t
∑z
s=0 ϕ
s
i/
∑z
s=0 λ
−s}z=1,...,h. In other words, we quantify how time periods and jurisdictions are
observationally equivalent ‘divisions’ in pollution permit markets as first analyzed in Yates (2002).
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restricted intertemporal trading within horizon h is allowed. Although effort-sharing gains
due to linking always decline when intertemporal trading is allowed, risk-sharing gains can
decrease or increase, resulting in non-negative efficiency gains which may be lower or higher
than in the case with no intertemporal trading. As further discussed in Appendix A.7, the or-
dering of E{δ⋆i,G,t} and E{δi,G,t} depends on the complex interaction between the time horizon
h, the discount factor λ and the shock properties {σi, ρij, ϕi}i,j∈G.
In our quantitative example, we argue that the efficiency gains due to linking are attenuated
but not eliminated when intertemporal permit trading is allowed. To that end, we first note
that when λ < 1 and shocks are similarly persistent across jurisdictions, i.e. ϕi ≃ ϕ < 1 for
all i ∈ G, efficiency gains are always attenuated by intertemporal trading and the ratios of
effort- and risk-sharing gains with and without intertemporal permit trading are given by
(
E{p⋆i,t − p
⋆
G,t}
E{pi,t − pG,t}
)2
≃
(
(h+ 1)(1− λ−1)
1− λ−h−1
)2
< 1, (28a)
and
V{p⋆i,t − p
⋆
G,t}
V{pi,t − pG,t}
≃
(
(1− ϕh+1)(1− λ−1)
(1− ϕ)(1− λ−h−1)
)2
< 1. (28b)
Table 2 reports the estimated shock persistence parameters when an AR(1) process is fitted
to our data which are approximately equal to 0.8 for all jurisdictions, i.e. ϕ ≈ 0.8, which is
coincidentally identical to the value Newell & Pizer (2003) estimate and use. Moreover, power
producers typically hedge production up to three years ahead, so h = 3 seems a reasonable
first-pass value.26 Finally, we take λ = 0.9 for the discount factor. Plugging in these values
in Equation (28) we find that intertemporal trading eats away about 30% and 60% of the
effort- and risk-sharing gains presented in Section 3.2, respectively.27 Notwithstanding the
attenuation in efficiency gains, we note that under unrestricted banking and borrowing,
Proposition 2 is unaltered and Proposition 3 holds up to the shock rescaling above.
Finally, we highlight some of the differences between the stylized theory of intertemporal
trading just analyzed and how it operates in practice. First, our theory assumes unrestricted
intertemporal trading. In reality, borrowing is almost never authorized and banking can be
limited, either by regulation via holding limits or due to firm-level internal or managerial con-
straints. Fell et al. (2012b) show that these constraints matter: as soon as they are expected
26See e.g. Neuhoff et al. (2012) and Schopp et al. (2015) and references therein in the case of the EU ETS.
This 3-year hedging is typically incomplete as producers keep opportunities open to exploit changes through
time, which means efficiency gains are likely to be reduced by less than what Equation (28) measures.
27In practice, caps are declining over time, typically at a rate of 2% per annum. When this is the case,
intertemporal trading implies that effort-sharing gains decrease by 32% relative to 28% with constant caps.
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to bind, banking offers little flexibility in smoothing out shocks.28 Second, observed price dy-
namics in the EU ETS and elsewhere suggest that banking strategies by firms are not optimal,
which might inter alia be caused by regulatory uncertainty (Salant, 2016; Fuss et al., 2018).
Third, firms may be rationally short-sighted for hedging purposes or because they are poorly
informed about future supply and demand conditions (Neuhoff et al., 2012; Schopp et al.,
2015; Quemin & Trotignon, 2019). Last but not least, some risk may be jurisdiction-specific
and so not diversifiable using intertemporal trading. Although a more comprehensive treat-
ment of these considerations is in order, they can be thought of as impinging on intertemporal
trading opportunities, de facto leaving more scope for inter-jurisdictional trading.
5 Conclusion
This paper advances the frontier of research on permit market integration by proposing a
general model to describe and analyze multilaterally-linked ETSs formally in a partial equi-
librium setup. In our model, efficiency gains and permit prices in any linkage group are
well-defined objects and we study their analytical properties. First, we identify the two inde-
pendent components which constitute the efficiency gains in any multilateral linkage, namely
the effort- and risk-sharing components. The former is determined by the inter-jurisdictional
variation in domestic ambition levels and the latter is driven by the nature of the uncer-
tainty affecting the demand for permits in individual jurisdictions. Second, we decompose
any multilateral linkage into its internal bilateral linkages. That is, we characterize aggregate
and individual gains in any linkage group as a weighted average of the aggregate gains in all
bilateral links that can be formed among its constituents. This decomposition formula is a
practical tool to compute the gains generated in arbitrary linkage groups. It further allows
us to rank groups from the perspective of individual jurisdictions and characterize the aggre-
gate gains from the union of disjoint groups analytically. Third, we clarify the relationship
between autarky and linking prices and show that relative to autarky, linkage reduces price
volatility on average but not necessarily for individual entities. Finally, we show that our key
findings hold when domestic caps are selected strategically or when unrestricted intertempo-
ral trading is allowed. In other words, risk-sharing gains from linkage are independent of cap
selection and remain substantial even when banking and borrowing is permitted.
Linkages between ETSs have a key role to play in the successful, cost-effective implementa-
tion of the Paris Agreement. To shed light on the magnitude and distribution of efficiency
28This is qualitatively similar to a decrease in h or Samuelson effect, see e.g. Parsons & Taschini (2013).
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gains from linkage, we use a quantitative application with jurisdictions of similar levels of
development which use, or have considered, both emissions trading and linking. We calibrate
our model to the power sector CO2 emissions of Australia, Canada, the EU, South Korea
and the USA under the assumption that each jurisdiction implements its Paris Agreement
pledges. The aforementioned theoretical and quantitative caveats of our analysis notwith-
standing, we find that linking the five jurisdictions together can generate aggregate effort-
and risk-sharing gains which are sizable and approximately equal to each other in magni-
tude. This suggests our theoretical findings can have significant relevance in policy-oriented
applications and help overcome the economic and political barriers to linking in practice.
Acknowledgments
The authors gratefully acknowledge funding from the Grantham Foundation for the Protec-
tion of the Environment, the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) through
the Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, and the Climate Economics Chair.
Simon Quemin acknowledges funding from LABEX Louis Bachelier Finance and Sustainable
Growth (ANR 11-LABX-0019 Project) under the ‘Investments for the Future’ programme,
in accordance with Article 8 of the Assigment Agreements for Communication Assistance.
We received helpful comments from the editor and two anonymous reviewers; participants
at the AEA, AERE, AFSE, CESifo, EAERE, EEA, FAERE, FSR and ISEFI annual confer-
ences in 2017 and 2018; and seminar participants at MCC Berlin, LSE, the universities of
Bologna, Cambridge, Edinburgh, Essen-Duisburg, Geneva, Madrid (IPP), Paris-Dauphine,
Queen Mary London and Verona. While revising this paper we learned about the passing of
Martin Weitzman who has been an inspiration to each of us over the years and who gener-
ously commented on an earlier version of this paper. We are forever in his debt. We would
also like to thank Alejandro Caparrós, Carolyn Fischer, Lawrence Goulder, Daniel Heyen,
Michael Pahle, John Parsons, Philippe Quirion, Robert Ritz, François Salanié, Alessandro
Tavoni, Oliver Tietjen, Ralph Winkler and Andrew Yates for valuable insights and conver-
sations at different stages of this project. Federica Buricco’s help in creating Figures 1 and 2
was invaluable. Our quantitative application relies heavily on modeling results from Enerdata
for which we are grateful. The usual disclaimers apply.
29
Tables
Table 1: Annual baseline emissions (q¯i, 10
6tCO2) and annual emissions caps (ωi, 10
6tCO2) ob-
tained from Enerdata. Calculated expected autarky permit prices (p¯i, 2005US$/tCO2), cali-
brated flexibility coefficients (γi, 10
3(tCO2)
2/2005US$), linear intercepts (βi, 2005US$/tCO2)
and ambition coefficients (αi = ωi/γi, 2005US$/tCO2) obtained using Enerdata data.
EUR AUS USA CAN KOR
q¯i 841.8 171.3 1,946.8 90.2 287.5
ωi 724.1 150.1 1,469.3 66.3 225.8
p¯i 89.8 27.1 92.8 113.7 92.6
βi 642.5 218.5 378.2 428.9 432.0
γi 1,309.9 784.1 5,146.4 210.2 665.3
αi 552.7 191.4 285.5 315.4 339.5
γi/q¯i 1.6 4.6 2.6 2.3 2.3
Table 2: Coefficients of variation of autarky permit prices (σi/p¯i), pairwise correlation coef-
ficients (ρij) and AR(1) shock persistences (ϕi)
EUR AUS USA CAN KOR
σi/p¯i 0.35 0.44 0.24 0.49 0.52
EUR 1
AUS 0.36 1
USA 0.07 0.42 1
CAN 0.18 0.18 0.43 1
KOR -0.15 0.24 0.51 0.00 1
ϕi 0.79 0.71 0.82 0.89 0.67
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Figures
Figure 1: Linkage preferences in the three-jurisdiction world {i, j, k}
(a) Bilateral linkages only
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Note: SUB refers to the symmetric uncertainty benchmark defined in text.
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Figure 2: Distribution and decomposition of efficiency gains in 5J (upper panel), 2J3J (mid-
dle panel) and 2J3J (lower panel). Colors identify jurisdictions and color shades identify
risk- (dark) and effort-sharing (light) gains. The areas of the various rectangles are compa-
rable across panels and proportional to the magnitude of the gains. Dotted areas demarcate
foregone efficiency gains relative to 5J . All numbers are billions of 2005US$ per year.
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Figure 3: Expected per-annum efficiency gains, coefficients of variation of permit prices and
components of gains in alternative linkage groups for USA
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Appendices
A Analytical derivations and collected proofs
Throughout we will sometimes denote G = {1, 2, . . . ,m} for some m ∈ [[3;n]].
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1 (effort- and risk-sharing gains)
Recalling the definition of i’s efficiency gains from G-linkage in Equation (9), we have
δG,i = Bi(qG,i; θi)− pG(qG,i − ωi)−Bi(ωi; θi)
= (βi + θi − pG)(qG,i − ωi)− (q
2
G,i − ω
2
i )/(2γi)
= qG,i(qG,i − ωi)/γi − (q
2
G,i − ω
2
i )/(2γi)
= (qG,i − ωi)
2/(2γi) = γi(pi − pG)
2/2,
(A.1)
where the third and fifth equalities obtain via the first-order condition in Equation (6) and
the net permit demand in Equation (8), respectively. Taking expectations and noting that
V{X} = E{X2} − E{X}2 for some random variable X concludes the proof.
Next, we make explicit the sources of the efficiency gains generated in G-linkage by character-
izing the reduction in emissions control costs due to the link. Specifically, let a˜i = q˜i−ωi > 0
and ∆Bi respectively denote i’s domestic abatement level and the associated foregone benefits
due to compliance with i’s binding cap under autarky, that is
∆Bi(a˜i) = Bi(q˜i; θi)−Bi(ωi; θi) = a˜
2
i /(2γi), (A.2)
where the second equality follows from ωi = q˜i− a˜i and q˜i = γi(βi+θi). By convexity of ∆Bi,
Jensen’s inequality implies that an increase in uncertainty about laissez-faire emissions (and
the corresponding cap stringency) raises the expected foregone benefits (or control costs)
under autarky. Note that because θi is mean-zero, E{∆Bi(a˜i)} can be decomposed as
E{∆Bi(a˜i)} = ∆Bi(q¯i − ωi) + E{∆Bi(q˜i − q¯i)} = γi(p¯
2
i + σ
2
i )/2, (A.3)
where the first term measures costs under certainty, which are proportional to i’s ambition
level, and the second term captures the increase in costs due to uncertainty, which is propor-
tional to the shock variance. By the same token, the aggregate expected control costs under
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G-linkage read ∑
i∈G
E{∆Bi(q˜i − qG,i)} = ΓG(p¯
2
G + V{ΘˆG})/2. (A.4)
Summing Equation (A.3) over i ∈ G gives the corresponding aggregate expected control costs
under autarky. Note that
∑
i∈G E{∆Bi(q˜i − qG,i)} ≤
∑
i∈G E{∆Bi(q˜i − ωi)} as it jointly holds
that ΓG p¯
2
G ≤
∑
i∈G γip¯
2
i and ΓGV{ΘˆG} ≤
∑
i∈G γiσ
2
i .
29 In words, for given caps, linkage induces
a cost-effective reduction in the group’s expected control costs by (1) spreading the expected
aggregate abatement effort in proportion to each member’s technology and (2) improving the
absorption of shocks within the linked system. Hence the effort- and risk-sharing gains.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2 (bilateral decomposition)
We first establish Equation (14). Substituting pG =
∑
i∈G γipi/ΓG into Equation (9) yields
δG,i = γi
( m∑
j=1,j 6=i
γj(pi − pj)
)2/
(2Γ2G)
= γi
m∑
j=1,j 6=i
γj
{
γj(pi − pj)
2 + 2
m∑
k>j,k 6=i
γk(pi − pj)(pi − pk)
}/
(2Γ2G).
(A.5)
It is useful to note that the two following identities hold true
2(pi − pj)(pi − pk) = (pi − pk + pk − pj)(pi − pk) + (pi − pj)(pi − pj + pj − pk)
= (pi − pj)
2 + (pi − pk)
2 − (pj − pk)
2, and
(A.6)
m∑
j=1
m∑
k>j,k 6=i
γjγk
{
(pi − pj)
2 + (pi − pk)
2
}
=
m∑
j=1
m∑
k=1,k 6=i,j
γjγk(pi − pj)
2. (A.7)
Using these identities and rearranging the sums in Equation (A.5), we obtain that
δG,i = γi
m∑
j=1
γj
{
(ΓG − γi)(pi − pj)
2 −
m∑
k>j,k 6=i
γk(pj − pk)
2
}/
(2Γ2G). (A.8)
Since the total {i, j}-linkage gains read ∆{i,j} = γiγj(pi− pj)
2/(2Γ{i,j}) and ΓG\{i} = ΓG − γi,
Equation (A.8) coincides with Equation (14). Summing over all i ∈ [[1;m]] then gives
∆G =
m∑
i=1
δG,i =
m∑
i=1
{ m∑
j=1,j 6=i
{
ΓG\{i}Γ{i,j}∆{i,j} − γi
m∑
k>j,k 6=i
Γ{j,k}∆{j,k}
}}/
Γ2G. (A.9)
29The first and second inequalities hold strictly provided that there exists (i, j) ∈ G2 such that p¯i 6= p¯j
and respectively ρij < 1 and/or σi 6= σj . See Appendix A.4 for a proof.
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Regrouping terms by bilateral linkages, Equation (A.9) rewrites
∆G =
∑
1≤i<j≤m
{
(ΓG\{i} + ΓG\{j})Γ{i,j}∆{i,j} −
m∑
k=1,k 6=i,j
γkΓ{i,j}∆{i,j}
}/
Γ2G
=
∑
1≤i<j≤m
{
(ΓG\{i} + ΓG\{j} − ΓG\{i,j})Γ{i,j}∆{i,j}
}/
Γ2G =
∑
1≤i<j≤m
Γ{i,j}∆{i,j}
/
ΓG.
(A.10)
By symmetry, i.e. ∆{i,j} = ∆{j,i}, Equation (A.10) coincides with Equation (15).
As a side note, because variance is a symmetric bilinear operator, it holds that
V{∆G} =
∑
(i,j)∈G×G
Γ{i,j}
∑
(k,l)∈G×G
Γ{k,l}Cov{∆{i,j}; ∆{k,l}}
/
(2ΓG)
2. (A.11)
Intuitively, although it is clear that I = arg maxG⊆I E{∆G}, there is no reason that forming
larger groups reduces volatility of gains and a fortiori that I = arg minG⊆I V{∆G}.
A.3 Proof of Equation (17)
With G and G ′ in I such that G ′ ⊂ G and with G ′′ = G\G ′, expanding Equation (15) gives
∆G =
( ∑
(i,j)∈G′×G′
Γ{i,j}∆{i,j} +
∑
(i,j)∈G′′×G′′
Γ{i,j}∆{i,j} + 2
∑
(i,j)∈G′×G′′
Γ{i,j}∆{i,j}
)/
(2ΓG)
=
(
ΓG′∆G′ + ΓG′′∆G′′ +
∑
(i,j)∈G′×G′′
Γ{i,j}∆{i,j}
)/
ΓG.
(A.12)
The aggregate gains from linking G ′ and G ′′ are ∆{G′,G′′} = ∆G −∆G′ −∆G′′ so that
∆{G′,G′′} =
( ∑
(i,j)∈G′×G′′
Γ{i,j}∆{i,j} +
(
ΓG′ − ΓG
)
∆G′ +
(
ΓG′′ − ΓG
)
∆G′′
)/
ΓG
=
( ∑
(i,j)∈G′×G′′
Γ{i,j}∆{i,j} − ΓG′′∆G′ − ΓG′∆G′′
)/
ΓG.
(A.13)
By transposing Equation (13a) from two singletons to two groups, it holds that
E{∆{G′,G′′}} = ΓG′ΓG′′
(
V{pG′}+ V{pG′′} − 2Cov{pG′ ; pG′′}
)/
(2ΓG) ≥ 0. (A.14)
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 3 (linking price properties)
For any G in I, first note that price volatilities satisfy ΓGV{pG}
1/2 ≤
∑
i∈G γiV{pi}
1/2 with a
strict inequality provided that there exists (i, j) ∈ G2 such that ρij < 1. Indeed,
Γ2GV{pG} =
∑
(i,j)∈G2
γiγjCov{pi; pj} ≤
∑
(i,j)∈G2
γiγjσiσj =
(∑
i∈G
γiV{pi}
1/2
)2
. (A.15)
Note that we have a similar inequality for price variances. Indeed, it jointly holds that
Γ2GV{pG} =
m∑
i=1
γ2i σ
2
i + 2
∑
1≤i<j≤m
γiγjρijσiσj, and (A.16a)
ΓG
m∑
j=1
γjV{pj} =
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
γiγjσ
2
j =
m∑
i=1
γ2i σ
2
i +
∑
1≤i<j≤m
γiγj(σ
2
i + σ
2
j ). (A.16b)
Then, ΓGV{pG} ≤
∑
i∈G γiV{pi} follows since σ
2
i + σ
2
j ≥ 2ρijσiσj and observe that the in-
equality holds strictly when there exists (i, j) ∈ G2 such that ρij < 1 and/or σi 6= σj.
Formally, a partition P ′ of I is coarser (or finer) than partition P with |P| ≥ 2 and d =
|P|−|P ′| ≥ 1 if there exists a sequence of partitions (Pi)i∈[[0;d]] such that P0 = P
′, Pd = P and
for all i ∈ [[1; d]] there exist (G ′i,G
′′
i ) ∈ Pi×Pi\{G
′
i} such that Pi−1 = {G
′
i ∪G
′′
i }∪Pi\{G
′
i,G
′′
i }.
It suffices to establish the rest of Statement (a) for a unitary linkage since the proof extends
to a more general case by transitivity over the relevant sequence of unitary linkages. Thus,
let P = {G1, . . . ,Gz} and assume w.l.o.g. that P
′ = {G1 ∪G2,G3, . . . ,Gz}. Then, it holds that
∑
G∈P ′
ΓGV{pG}
1/2 =
z∑
k=3
ΓGkV{pGk}
1/2 +
(
Γ2G1V{pG1}+ Γ
2
G2
V{pG2}+ 2ΓG1ΓG2Cov{pG1 ; pG2}
)1/2
.
(A.17)
The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality gives |Cov{pG1 ; pG2}| ≤ V{pG1}
1/2
V{pG2}
1/2 and concludes.
We now turn to Statement (b). Note that it is sufficient to verify the claim on jurisdictional
price variability as a result of linkage for bilateral links – the argument naturally extends to
multilateral links. Then, by applying Equation (A.16a) to {i, j}-linkage it holds that
V{p{i,j}} =
(
γ2iV{pi}+ γ
2
jV{pj}+ 2ρijγiγj(V{pi}V{pj})
1/2
)/
Γ2G. (A.18)
Assume w.l.o.g. that jurisdiction i is the less volatile jurisdiction, i.e. σj ≥ σi. Then, {i, j}-
linkage reduces price volatility in the high-volatility jurisdiction i.f.f. V{pj} ≥ V{p{i,j}}, that
is i.f.f.
γi(σ
2
j − σ
2
i ) + 2γjσj(σj − ρijσi) ≥ 0, (A.19)
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and unconditionally holds, i.e. for all γi, γj, σj ≥ σi and ρij ∈ [−1; 1]. For the low-volatility
jurisdiction, however, V{pi} ≥ V{p{i,j}} holds if and only if
γj(σ
2
i − σ
2
j ) + 2γiσi(σi − ρijσj) ≥ 0 ⇔
γj
γi
≤
2σi(σi − ρijσj)
σ2j − σ
2
i
. (A.20)
For a given triple (σi, σj, ρij), {i, j}-linkage effectively reduces volatility in the low-volatility
jurisdiction provided that the high-volatility jurisdiction’s γ is relatively not too large.
Finally, to establish the claim on price convergence in probability, we let G be ordered such
that γ1 ≤ . . . ≤ γm, and denote σ¯ = maxi∈G σi. Fix ε > 0. Then, it holds that
P
(
|ΘˆG − E{ΘˆG}| > ε
)
≤ E
{
(ΘˆG − E{ΘˆG})
2
}/
ε2 = V{ΘˆG}
/
ε2
=
m∑
i=1
{
γ2i σ
2
i +
m∑
j=1
ρijγiγiσiσj
}/
(εΓG)
2
≤
(
γmσ¯
γ1ε
)2 [
1
m
+ 1
]
,
(A.21)
where the first inequality is Chebyshev’s inequality and the second follows by construction.
Since γm and σ¯ are finite, only when the second term in the above bracket is nil (i.e. shocks
are independent) does it hold that pG converges in probability towards p¯G as |G| tends to
infinity, that is limm→+∞P
(
|ΘˆG − E{ΘˆG}| > ε
)
= 0, i.e. limm→+∞P
(
|ΘˆG − E{ΘˆG}| ≤ ε
)
= 1.
A.5 A proof for the non-alignment of preferences
We prove the following claim for the non-alignment of linkage preferences:
In the absence of inter-jurisdictional monetary transfers, jurisdictional linkage preferences
are not aligned in the sense that
(a) I-linkage may or may not be the most preferred linkage group for all jurisdictions in I;
(b) any G ⊂ I cannot be the most preferred linkage group for all jurisdictions in G.
Fix G ′ ⊂ I. Let G ⊃ G ′ be a proper superset of G ′ and denote by G ′′ = G∩G ′ the complement
of G ′ in G. By way of contradiction, assume that E{δG′,i} ≥ E{δG,i} holds for all i ∈ G
′, with
at least one inequality holding strictly. By summation over i ∈ G ′
∑
i∈G′
E{δG′,i} = E{∆G′} >
∑
i∈G′
E{δG,i} = E{∆G} −
∑
i∈G′′
E{δG,i} (A.22)
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Recalling that ∆{G′,G′′} = ∆G −∆G′ −∆G′′ , Equation (A.22) imposes
E{∆G′′}+ E{∆{G′,G′′}} −
∑
i∈G′′
E{δG,i} < 0, (A.23)
and contradicts superadditivity, which requires the above expression to be non-negative.
That is, G ′ cannot be the most weakly preferred linkage coalition for all jurisdictions thereof.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4 (endogenous cap selection)
Let Di denote i’s damage function with MDi = ηi constant and positive. For any partition
P of I we let Ω−iP =
∑
j∈I\{i} ωP,j where ωP,j is j’s cap given P . Let also A = {{1}, . . . , {n}}
denote complete autarky. The autarkic Cournot-Nash caps satisfy, for all i ∈ I
ωA,i = argmax
ω>0
E
{
Bi(ω; θi)−Di
(
ω + Ω−iA
) }
= γi(βi − ηi) > 0. (A.24)
By identification with Equations (4) and (5) we find jurisdictional ambition parameters and
expected autarky permit prices to be αi = βi − ηi ∈ (0; βi) and p¯i = ηi > 0.
Jurisdictional regulators can anticipate linkage when selecting their caps. This situation is
congruent with a two-stage game where regulators set caps at stage one and permit trading
between linked markets occurs at stage two. We solve this game using backward induction
and focus on subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Fix a partition P of I. Crucially, because
reaction functions are orthogonal, individual cap-setting decisions in any G ∈ P will only be
affected by the perspective of G-linkage but not by what happens outside G.
Stage 2: Inter-jurisdictional permit trading and emissions choices.
Take any G ∈ P . Given cap and realized shock profiles (ωi)i∈G and (θi)i∈G, Equations (7)
and (6) respectively give the equilibrium permit price p∗G and emission level in i q
∗
G,i
p∗G(ΩG; (θi)i∈G) =
(∑
i∈G
γiβi − ΩG
)/
ΓG + ΘˆG, (A.25a)
and q∗G,i(ΩG; (θi)i∈G) = γi(βi + θi − p
∗
G(ΩG; (θi)i∈G)). (A.25b)
We then obtain the intuitive comparative statics results: ∂p∗G/∂ΩG = ∂p
∗
G/∂ωi = −1/ΓG < 0
and ∂q∗G,i/∂ΩG = ∂q
∗
G,i/∂ωi = γi/ΓG ∈ (0; 1).
Stage 1: Cournot-Nash domestic cap selection.
Upon setting its cap, each regulator knows firms’ optimal emission reactions and recognizes
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the implications of its decision on the expected permit price and its own net market position.
The Cournot-Nash caps with strategic anticipation of G-linkage (ωG,i)i∈G satisfy, for all i in
G,
ωG,i = arg max
ω>0
E
{
Bi
(
q∗G,i(ω + Ω
−i
G ; (θi)i∈G); θi
)
−Di(ω + Ω
−i
G )
+ p∗G(ω + Ω
−i
G ; (θi)i∈G)
(
ω − q∗G,i(ω + Ω
−i
G ; (θi)i∈G)
)}
,
(A.26)
where the third term is the net proceeds from inter-jurisdictional permit trading. By stage-2
optimality, i.e. ∂Bi(q
∗
G,i; θi)/∂qi = p
∗
G, the necessary first-order condition writes
E{p∗G} − ηi = E
{ ∂p∗G
∂ΩG
(q∗G,i − ωG,i)
}
= (ωG,i − E{q
∗
G,i})/ΓG. (A.27)
Summing over i ∈ G and by market closure, we obtain E{p∗G} = 〈η〉G =
∑
i∈G ηi/|G|. It thus
holds that ωG,i − E{q
∗
G,i} = ΓG(〈η〉G − ηi), i.e. jurisdiction i is net selling under G-linkage in
expectation i.f.f. its marginal damage is lower than G’s average. Since E{q∗G,i} = γi(βi−〈η〉G),
we have
ωG,i = (ΓG − γi)(〈η〉G − ηi) + ωA,i ≥ ωA,i ⇔ 〈η〉G ≥ ηi. (A.28)
In aggregate, (anticipated) linkage leads to higher emissions relative to autarky i.f.f.
∑
i∈G
ωG,i − ωA,i =
∑
i∈G
γi(ηi − 〈η〉G) ≥ 0. (A.29)
As in Helm (2003), inter-jurisdictional permit trading has an ambiguous effect on aggregate
pollution, which depends on the distributions of the ηi’s and γi’s. Consider for instance the
special case of marginal damages proportional to flexibilities, i.e. ηi = ηγi for all i ∈ I. Then,
∑
i∈G
ωG,i − ωA,i = η
∑
i∈G
γi(γi − 〈γ〉G) = η
∑
i∈G
γi
(
(|G| − 1)γi −
∑
j 6=i
γj
)/
|G|
= η
∑
i∈G
∑
j 6=i
γi(γi − γj)/|G| = η
∑
(i,j)∈G2
(γi − γj)
2/(2|G|),
which is always non-negative and positive provided that there exists (i, j) ∈ G2 such that
γi 6= γj, but note that our result is reversed if we assume ηi = η/γi for all i ∈ I instead.
Welfare gains from linkage accruing to jurisdiction i belonging to any linkage group G ∈ P
amount to
Bi(qG,i; θi)−Bi(ωA,i; θi) + pG(ωG,i − qG,i) +Di(ΩA)−Di(ΩP). (A.30)
By adding and subtracting pGωA,i it is convenient to decompose the expected welfare gains
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from linkage E{δ∗i,G} into efficiency gains from inter-jurisdictional permit trading, strategic
effect due to domestic cap selection in anticipation of linkage, and damage effect, that is
E{δ∗i,G} = E{Bi(qG,i; θi)−Bi(ωA,i; θi) + pG(ωA,i − qG,i)}
+ E{pG(ωG,i − ωA,i)}+ E{Di(ΩA)−Di(ΩP)}.
(A.31)
After standard computations, we find each of these components to be worth
E{Bi(qG,i; θi)−Bi(ωA,i; θi) + pG(ωA,i − qG,i)} = γi
(
(ηi − 〈η〉G)
2 + V{θi − ΘˆG}
)/
2, (A.32)
E{pG(ωG,i − ωA,i)} = 〈η〉G(ΓG − γi)(〈η〉G − ηi), (A.33)
and E{Di(ΩA)−Di(ΩP)} = ηi
∑
G∈P
∑
j∈G
γj(〈η〉G − ηj). (A.34)
A.7 Proof of Proposition 5 (intertemporal trading)
We take the perspective of a group which might be degenerate, i.e. a single jurisdiction. The
group-wide shock and benefit parameters (linear intercept and slope) obtain by horizontal
summation of the individual marginal benefit schedules. In the following, we drop the group
index for clarity and without loss of generality.
We adopt a dynamic programming approach and assume that time t runs in [[1;T ]] where T
is the date at which the problem effectively ends. Let bt ≷ 0 denote the volume of the permit
bank at time t (a negative bank corresponds to borrowing) with b0 = 0 and bT ≥ 0. At each
time t the group emits qt = ωt + bt−1 − bt and faces the recursive optimization problem
Vt(bt−1; θt−1) = max
bt
[
Bt(ωt + bt−1 − bt; θt) + λEt{Vt+1(bt; θt)}
]
, (A.35)
where bt is the control variable to simplify taking derivatives, and λ denotes the discount
factor. The first-order condition reads and the envelope theorem yields
−MBt(qt; θt) + λEt
{∂Vt+1
∂bt
(bt; θt)
}
= 0, (A.36a)
∂Vt
∂bt−1
(bt−1; θt−1) = MBt(qt; θt), (A.36b)
so that we obtain the standard result that the discounted equilibrium marginal benefit (i.e. the
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discounted permit price) is a martingale via the no-arbitrage condition under uncertainty
MBt(qt; θt) = λEt{MBt+1(qt+1; θt+1)}. (A.37)
Let h = T − t denote the number of future periods at time t. The period-t equilibrium price
with intertemporal trading p⋆t obtains through chaining the optimal law of motion across two
adjacent periods in Equation (A.37) over the remaining h periods
p⋆t = MBt(qt; θt) = λEt{MBt+1(qt+1; θt+1)} = · · · = λ
h
Et{MBt+h(qt+h; θt+h)}, (A.38)
where we have used the tower rule (Et{Et+z{·}} = Et{·} for any z ∈ [[0;h]]), together with
overall market closure at the terminal date bT ≥ 0, or
∑T
z=t qz ≤ bt−1+
∑T
z=t ωt. The period-t
expected price path satisfies Hotelling’s rule.
To simplify computations and without loss of generality, we assume that βt = βt+1, γt = γt+1
and ωt = ωt+1 for all t. Solving Equation (A.38) with period-T market clearing thus yields
Et{p
⋆
t+z} = λ
−zp⋆t for any z ∈ [[0;h]] with p
⋆
t =
(
(h+ 1)p¯− bt−1/γ + θtΦ
)/
Λ. (A.39)
Setting bt−1 = 0 then gives Equation (24), and Equation (26) follows thanks to the linearity
of both the group-wide shock in the individual shocks and the group’s expected price in the
expected autarky prices. Our determination of p⋆t (and below δ
⋆
i,G,t) can be extended to allow
for time varying caps and benefit functions as well as heterogeneity in discounting.
Equation (27) obtains by computing δ⋆i,G,t and taking expectation. Comparing Equations (10)
and (27), we have E{δ⋆i,G,t} = E{δi,G,t} only when h = 0 or when ϕi = 1 for all i ∈ G and
λ = 1. When h ≥ 1, it is typically the case that E{δ⋆i,G,t} 6= E{δi,G,t} and their ordering will
depend on the values of the jurisdiction-specific persistence parameters, the common discount
factor and the length of the time horizon. We note that when h→∞ or λ→ 0, intertemporal
permit trade attenuates the efficiency gains due to linking towards zero, i.e. E{δ⋆i,G,t} → 0.
In particular, given an arbitrary λ < 1 there exists a threshold value of h above which
E{δ⋆i,G,t} < E{δi,G,t} holds unambiguously. When h is small the ordering of E{δ
⋆
i,G,t} and
E{δi,G,t} depends on the complex interaction between h and shock properties {σi, ρij, ϕi}i,j∈G.
We explore this analytically below in the case of a bilateral link.
The aggregate and jurisdictional risk-sharing gains due to {i, j}-linkage are proportional to
RS⋆ =
(
Φ2iσ
2
i + Φ
2
jσ
2
j − 2ρijΦiΦjσiσi
)/
Λ2 or RS = σ2i + σ
2
j − 2ρijσiσj (A.40)
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with or without intertemporal trading, respectively, where Φi =
∑h
z=0 ϕ
z
i and Λ =
∑h
z=0 λ
−z.
Let prime denote the partial derivative w.r.t. ϕi, then we have
RS ′⋆ ≥ 0 ⇔ Φ
′
iΦiσi ≥ ρijΦ
′
iΦjσj (A.41)
since (Φ2i )
′ = 2Φ′iΦi where Φ
′
i =
∑h
z=1 zϕ
z−1
i . In general, RS
′
⋆ ≷ 0 which crucially depends
on the behavior of and the interaction between the series Φi, Φj, and Φ
′
i. The former, Φi, is
equal to h + 1 when ϕi = 1; positive and increasing with ϕi and h when ϕi ∈ (0; 1); equal
to 1 when ϕi = 0; non-monotonic in ϕi and h but non-negative for ϕi ∈ (−1; 0); alternating
between 0 and 1 when ϕi = −1. Its partial derivative, Φ
′
i, is positive and increasing with
ϕi and h when ϕi > 0; equal to 1 for all h when ϕi = 0; non-monotonic in ϕi and h but
non-negative for ϕi ∈ [−0.5; 0); of alternate sign (negative for h ≥ 3 and odd) below some
threshold h value and then always positive when ϕi ∈ (−1;−0.5); of alternate sign (negative
for all h odd) when ϕi = −1. In the two-period no-discount case h = λ = 1, Equation (A.41)
simplifies to RS ′⋆ ≥ 0 ⇔ (1 + ϕi)σi ≥ ρij(1 + ϕj)σj.
Similarly, it is not straightforward to compare RS⋆ and RS. Indeed,
RS⋆ ≥ RS ⇔ (Φ
2
i − Λ
2)σ2i + (Φ
2
j − Λ
2)σ2j − 2ρij(ΦiΦj − Λ
2)σiσj ≥ 0, (A.42)
The behavior of Φ2i is like that of Φi. The series Λ is equal to h + 1 at most when λ = 1
for all h; increasing with h; decreasing with λ. By contrast, it is straightforward to show
that allowing for intertemporal trading always reduces the effort-sharing gains from linkage
by a fraction ((h+ 1)/Λ)2. In the two-period no-discount case h = λ = 1 with ϕi = 1, effort
sharing is unaltered and Equation (A.42) simplifies to RS⋆ ≥ RS ⇔ ρij(3 + ϕj)σi ≥ σj.
Finally, we clarify the mathematical statement in footnote 23 by specifying the behavior of
the series Φi/Λ. It is equal to 1 when ϕi = 1 and λ = 1; increasing with ϕi and λ and
decreasing with h when ϕi ≥ 0; essentially increasing with ϕi and λ and decreasing with h
when ϕi < 0, although may be non-monotonic locally for small h values and large λ values.
B Calibration methodology
This appendix describes the calibration of jurisdictional annual emission caps (ωi), baseline
emissions (q¯i), volume-adjusted technologies (γi) and linear intercepts (βi) based on propri-
etary data we obtained from Enerdata; and the calibration of price shock volatilities (σi), the
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pairwise correlations across jurisdictions (ρij) and the AR(1) shock persistences (ϕi) based
on IEA data on historical power sector emissions. In our quantitative illustration we focus
on five jurisdictions with similar levels of development and which all use, or have considered
using, both emissions trading and linking: Australia (AUS), Canada (CAN), the European
Union (EUR), South Korea (KOR) and the United States (USA).
We obtained annual emissions caps and MACCs of the power sectors from Enerdata. First,
Enerdata models emission caps consistent to three possible scenarios. The Ener-Brown sce-
nario describes a world with durably low fossil fuel energy prices. The Ener-Blue scenario
provides an outlook of energy systems based on the achievement of the 2030 targets defined
in the NDCs as announced at COP 21. The Ener-Green scenario explores the implications
of more stringent energy and climate policies to limit the global temperature increase at
around 1.5-2oC by the end of the century. We selected the scenario with annual emission
caps consistent with the Paris INDCs (Ener-Blue scenario).
Second, Enerdata also generates MACCs and annual emission baselines using the Prospective
Outlook on Long-term Energy Systems (POLES) model. MACCs are available for four time
periods (2025, 2030, 2035 and 2040). We selected emission baselines and the MACCs available
for 2030. Using these annual caps and MACCs, we compute the expected autarky permit
prices, which range from 27.1 in AUS to 113.7$/tCO2 in Canada. All monetary quantities
are expressed in constant 2005US$. A linear interpolation of MACCs around domestic caps
gives the linear intercept βi and the inverse of its slope γi, reported in Table 1.
The shock characteristics are calibrated using historical times series of CO2 emissions from
the jurisdictional power sectors. We obtain annual data covering 1972-2015 from the Inter-
national Energy Agency. We denote observed emissions from jurisdiction i in year t by ei,t.
We identify historical emission levels with laissez-faire emissions, i.e. we assume that no or
relatively lax regulations on CO2 emissions were in place prior to 2015.
In Equation (2) laissez-faire emissions q˜i comprise a constant term, the baseline q¯i = γiβi,
and a variable term, q˜i− q¯i = γiθi. Assuming the latter is small enough relative to the former,
we obtain the following linear Taylor approximation for the natural logarithm of laissez-faire
emissions
ln(q˜i) ≃ ln(q¯i) + (q˜i − q¯i)/q¯i. (B.1)
We associate the variable term in the above to the residual from the regression of ln(ei,t) on
time and the square of time. In other words, we use log-quadratic detrending to decompose
ln(ei,t) into trend and cyclical components (Uribe & Schmitt-Grohé, 2017). This is consistent
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with our interpretation of variations in marginal benefits of emissions as being driven by
business cycles, TFP shocks, changes in the prices of factors of production, jurisdiction-
specific events, weather fluctuations, etc.
Specifically, we denote the residuals from the regression ǫi,t. To calibrate shock characteristics,
we assume that {ǫi,t}’s provide information about the distributions of the underlying shocks
θi’s. Then, given our modeling framework, ǫi,t is related to a draw from the distribution of
θi such that
ǫi,t = (q˜i − q¯i)/q¯i = θi/βi. (B.2)
Note that {ǫi,t}’s are mean zero by construction. We compute the standard deviation of θi
consistent with the model using
σi = σ(βiǫi,t), (B.3)
and the standard deviation of domestic laissez-faire power-sector emissions simply obtain by
the rescaling γiσi. Table 3 below reports the standard deviations of autarky permit prices
(σi) and normalized standard deviations of laissez-faire emissions (σ(ǫi,t) = γiσi/q¯i). The
table also includes the estimated persistence parameter ϕi when an AR(1) model is fitted to
{ǫi,t}. We used the estimated ϕi’s to argue for the validity of the rule of thumb in Equation
(28) discussed in the intertemporal trading extension in Section 4.2.
Table 3: Standard deviations of autarky prices (σi, 2005US$/tCO2), normalized standard
deviations of laissez-faire emissions (σ(ǫi,t) = γiσi/q¯i) and AR(1) shock persistences (ϕi)
EUR AUS USA CAN KOR
σi 31.4 11.8 21.9 56.3 48.4
σ(ǫi,t) 0.049 0.054 0.058 0.131 0.112
ϕi 0.79 0.71 0.82 0.89 0.67
Note that price shock variabilities are roughly such that p¯i > 2σi and βi > p¯G + 2V{ΘˆG}
1/2
for any jurisdiction i and any possible group in our sample, i.e. zero-price and zero-emissions
corners can safely be neglected.30 Therefore, our focus on interior autarky and linking market
equilibria is of negligible consequence for our analysis of linkage gains.
Finally, we calibrate pairwise correlation between shocks in i and j using
ρij = Corr(βiǫi,t, βjǫj,t). (B.4)
30Note that a sufficient condition for the second type of inequalities to hold is βi > p¯i + 2σi for all i.
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and note that the ρij’s – reported in Table 2 – can be positive, negative or approximately zero.
We also note that this large variation in inter-jurisdictional correlation is to be expected.
To see why note that emissions of jurisdictions whose economies are tightly interconnected
through trade and financial flows will likely move together, especially if jurisdictions’ emis-
sions are procyclical. If the economic links between jurisdictions are weak and/or they are
geographically distant, one would expect a low level of correlation. Finally, if a jurisdiction’s
business cycles are negatively correlated with others, also observing negative correlations in
emissions fluctuations would not be surprising. These conjectures are consistent with empir-
ical studies such as Calderón et al. (2007) which provides evidence on international business
cycle synchronization and trade intensity, and Doda (2014) which analyzes the business cycle
properties of emissions. Finally, Burtraw et al. (2013) suggest that demand for permits may
be negatively correlated over space due to exogenous weather shocks.
We highlight the following three points regarding our calibration strategy and results. First,
we assume that the pair characteristics are not affected by the recent introduction of climate
change policies. Some emitters in some of the jurisdictions in our sample are regulated under
these policies. We argue that any possible effect would be limited because these policies have
not been particularly stringent, affect only a portion of the jurisdiction’s emissions, and do
so only in the last few years of our sample. Second, we use the log quadratic filter to decom-
pose the observed emissions series into its trend and cyclical components. Not surprisingly,
the calibrated shock characteristics are altered quantitatively when we alternatively use the
band pass filter recommended by Baxter & King (1999), the random walk band pass filter
recommended by Christiano & Fitzgerald (2003) or the Hodrick-Prescott filter as detrending
procedures. However, our conclusions are similar qualitatively so we restrict our attention to
the simple and transparent log quadratic detrending. Third, we take the calibrated ρij’s at
face value in our computations, rather than setting insignificant correlations to zero, which
does not alter the results in a meaningful way.
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